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A Perfect Storm: Environmental Justice and 
Air Quality Impacts of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf
Kayla Race
Abstract
The Arctic Outer Continental Shelf is the next great legal battleground 
over oil and gas resources, environmental protection, and environmental jus-
tice.  The Arctic is home to an array of sensitive ecological resources and a 
large Native Alaskan population that relies heavily on the natural environ-
ment for food and supplies.  The Arctic Ocean also holds a vast amount of 
untapped oil and gas resources that had previously been largely inaccessible 
because of harsh climatic conditions and withdrawals of large swaths of the 
Shelf by Congress and multiple presidents.  However, climate change is melt-
ing Arctic sea ice and opening up previously inaccessible areas.  In addition, 
President Trump is pushing to expand oil and gas development everywhere, 
including the Arctic.  If President Trump’s plans prevail against the many legal 
challenges seeking to protect the Arctic, Native Alaskans will face a multitude 
of threats to their health, safety, and way of life.
Scholars, journalists, and environmental groups have already illuminated 
the threats of oil spills and climate change.  This Comment focuses on a less dis-
cussed impact of offshore oil and gas development: air pollution and its effects 
on Native Alaskans.  Onshore oil and gas development has already been pol-
luting the air of Alaskan communities, causing increases in respiratory illnesses 
and other health problems, and leading to climate change, which is disrupting 
the natural environment upon which Native Alaskans depend for food and 
supplies.  A new era of offshore development would amplify these problems 
and create new and unique challenges that disproportionately burden Native 
Alaskan communities.
This Comment makes two novel contributions.  First, it illuminates the 
erratic history and disjointed nature of air quality regulation on the Outer 
Continental Shelf.  Second, this Comment highlights how the federal govern-
ment’s current regulatory structure for offshore air emissions uniquely fails 
Native Alaskans who are seeking to protect their health and way of life.  In 
addition, this Comment makes some recommendations for statutory and reg-
ulatory changes to better address the environmental justice impacts of air 
pollution from offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic.
© 2020 Kayla Race
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Introduction
The oil and gas industry has been encircling Alaska’s North Slope with 
development in every direction, and now has Native Alaskan villages in 
a chokehold.  On February 15, 2012, a “wall of coffee-colored smoke rolled 
toward the village of Nuiqsut.”1  Eighteen miles from the village and 1.75 miles 
inland from the Arctic coastline, an exploratory oil well owned by Repsol on 
the North Slope of Alaska had suffered a blowout, sending gas and 42,000 gal-
lons of drilling mud shooting out of the well for nearly nine hours.2  Panicked 
Nuiqsut residents scrambled to contact local authorities to find out if they 
should evacuate, but found no answers.3  The village’s air monitoring equip-
ment happened to be down for “routine maintenance” at the time.4  It also just 
so happened that the entity in charge of monitoring Nuiqsut’s air was Cono-
coPhillips, the oil company that owned drilling sites on the outskirt of town.5
Many villagers reported feeling ill that day, but the response from the 
oil industry and state agencies alike has been dismissive.6  ConocoPhillips said 
decades of the company’s air monitoring data shows “the air quality of the North 
Slope . . . is consistently better than national ambient air quality standards.” 7 
The chairman of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission—the 
state agency that regulates drilling for worker safety and environmental 
1. Sabrina Shankman, Oil Boom Sets Off Health Fears in Alaskan Arctic, S.F. Chron. 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/Oil-boom-sets-off-health-fears-in-
Alaskan-Arctic-13124725.php [https://perma.cc/HBT9-2R2X] [hereinafter Shankman, Oil 
Boom].
2. Richard Mauer, North Slope Oil Well Suffers a Blowout, Anchorage Daily 
News (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.adn.com/economy/article/north-slope-oil-well-suffers- 
blowout/2012/02/15 [https://perma.cc/T66M-NSJ2].  Reports just over a month later indi-
cated that as much as 91,939 gallons of liquid had been spilled and cleaned up at the February 
2012 incident.  Tim Bradner, Repsol Closes Exploration Well After Gas Blowout, Alaska J. of 
Com. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.alaskajournal.com/business-and-finance/2012-03-19/ repsol-
cements-closes-exploration-well-after-gas-blowout [https://perma.cc/92DJ-BZNC].
3. Shankman, Oil Boom, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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protection—simply said: “Blowouts are exceedingly rare.”8  Nevertheless, just 
over a year later, on April 9, 2013, 6,600 gallons of crude oil sprayed out of 
another Repsol oil well located on Alaska’s North Slope.9  This trend was con-
cerning, given that Repsol held the exploration rights to more than 500,000 
acres in Alaska10 and more than 100 offshore leases in the Chukchi Sea, making 
it second only to Shell in Arctic oil and gas exploration.11
Nuiqsut residents’ concerns are broader than pollution from one-off 
blowouts.  Nuiqsut residents have reported that the “every-day airborne pol-
lutants from vast drilling operations” surrounding the village form a “hazy 
green” sky and “black soot on the snow.” 12  As a result, “noses run and asthma 
flares up.”13  The number of people in Nuiqsut being treated for respiratory 
illness rose from one person in 1986 to seventy-five people by the turn of the 
century—a “stunning” increase for a village of 400 people.14  A doctor told 
one mother who rushed her son to urgent medical care for respiratory distress 
on several occasions, “It’s something in the air he’s breathing.”15  State offi-
cials, however, assert that the connection between residents’ symptoms and 
the industry’s pollution is too attenuated.  “Studies done by various state and 
regional agencies, based largely on ConocoPhillips’ data, attribute respiratory 
health issues to spikes in viruses, smoking, poor indoor ventilation and cars left 
idling for hours in freezing temperatures.”16  Some Nuiqsut residents tried to 
prove the connection between their respiratory problems and oil and gas pol-
lution by initiating a community-based air monitoring program, but fear of 
retribution by community elders with ties to the oil and gas industry thwarted 
these monitoring efforts.17
In addition to the immediate health impacts of oil and gas pollution 
in their village, Nuiqsut residents worry about the impact of the industry 
(onshore and offshore) and climate change on their native fishing, whaling, 
8. Mauer, supra note 2.  According to a local news article, the Commissioner also 
noted that “[s]ince 1949, Alaska’s 7,553 wells have generated 19 blowouts.  None have 
resulted in oil spills on tundra or water, he said.  Before [the blowout at issue in the article], 
the last blowout on the North Slope was in 1994 in the Endicott field.”  Id.
9. Braden Reddall & Joseph Radford, Repsol Suffers Spill at Alaska Exploration Well, 
Reuters (Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-repsol-alaska/repsol-suffers-
spill-at-alaska-exploration-well-state-idUSBRE93900X20130410 [https://perma.cc/GC75-
W4C6].
10. Id.
11. Mauer, supra note 2.
12. Shankman, Oil Boom, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Sabrina Shankman, Surrounded by Oil Fields, an Alaska Village Fears for Its Health, 
Inside Climate News (Aug. 2, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01082018/alaska-
north-slope-oil-drilling-health-fears-pollution-risk-native-village-nuiqsut [https://perma.cc/
C96T-7AHY] [hereinafter Shankman, Surrounded by Oil Fields].
15. Shankman, Oil Boom, supra note 1.
16. Shankman, Surrounded by Oil Fields, supra note 14.
17. Id.
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and hunting activities—the primary source of food for more than three-quar-
ters of Nuiqsut residents.18  Greenhouse gas emissions associated with oil and 
gas production contribute to climate change, which is “causing Arctic tem-
peratures to rise twice as fast as the global average, changing the sea ice and 
impacting species that people rely on for hunting.”19  In addition, offshore drill-
ing carries the unique risks of oil spills and increased marine traffic that could 
physically interfere with Native whaling and fishing activities.20  The Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)—the federal agency responsible for 
permitting oil and gas activities in federal waters—acknowledged that drill-
ing in Arctic waters presents “possible conflicts” with the subsistence hunting 
and fishing activities of Native communities.21  Further, harmful air pollutants 
from offshore drilling threaten the health of Native Alaskan hunters, including 
those from Nuiqsut, who “spend extended periods of time closer to the emis-
sions sources”22 because their pursuit of whales and walruses takes them up to 
sixty miles offshore, toward drilling activities.23  In response to a legal challenge 
brought by the Native Village of Point Hope24 and other environmental jus-
tice groups against Shell’s offshore drilling efforts, the Environmental Appeals 
Board of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognized the 
unique air emissions impacts of Arctic offshore drilling on Native Alaskans 
in the North Slope.25  This array of problems could worsen for the Villages of 
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also John Tetpon, Lack of Ice and Climate Change Creating Fear in Alaska—
Subsistence Hunting is Becoming a Key Issue as Food Becomes More Scarce, Anchorage 
Press (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.anchoragepress.com/lack-of-ice-and-climate-change-
creating-fear-in-alaska/article_aae8b78e-49e7-11e9-b9d7-e3dbcb42f1e3.html [https://perma.
cc/3WNE-ZP5X]; Michael Brubaker, et al., Center for Climate and Health, Climate 
Change in Nuiqsut, Alaska, Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (July 2014), 
https://anthc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CCH_AR_072014_Climate-Change-in-
Nuiqsut.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9W9-Q3FE].  Moreover, climate change is even threatening 
some native villages’ very existence.  See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 
F.3d 849, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2012).
20. Jerry Beilinson, Everything You Need to Know About Shell Oil and Arctic Offshore 
Drilling in Alaska, Popular Mechanics, Sept. 14, 2012, https://www.popularmechanics.com/
science/energy/a7938/everything-you-need-to-know-about-shell-oil-and-arctic-offshore-
drilling-in-alaska-10720112 [https://perma.cc/DE7T-4ZHP].
21. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017–2022 Outer Continental Shelf 
Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed Final Program S-3 (Nov. 2016),  https://www.boem.
gov/2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP [https://perma.cc/5G3T-H5J4] [hereinafter 
BOEM, 2017–2022 OCS Program].
22. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *31, n.80 (EAB 2010) 
(internal quotes and citation omitted).
23. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *18, n.32 (EAB 2012).
24. The Native Village of Point Hope is located on Alaska’s North Slope along the 
Chukchi Sea, west of Nuiqsut.
25. See Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *31–32, n.80 (EAB 
2010) (internal quotes and citations omitted).  After promising preliminary results, this mul-
tiyear legal battle ultimately ended with Shell receiving all approvals needed to drill.  See 
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Nuiqsut, Point Hope, and others similarly situated if the Trump Administration 
succeeds in its quest to foster more Arctic drilling, both onshore and offshore.26 
In particular, a new era of offshore development would amplify the challenges 
that uniquely burden Native Alaskan communities.
In the past, offshore drilling in the Arctic had been limited by what the 
U.S. Department of the Interior described as “unique challenges associated 
with environmental and weather conditions, geographical remoteness, social 
and cultural considerations, and the absence of fixed infrastructure to support 
oil and gas activity, including resources necessary to respond in the event of an 
emergency.”27  BOEM has recognized the “risks of oil and gas activity to the 
Arctic may . . . be greater than in other regions.”28  The sea ice that pervades for 
most of the year, the months without sun, the “[e]xtended periods of heavy fog, 
freezing temperatures and weeklong storms approaching hurricane strength” 
have earned the Arctic descriptors such as “demanding and challenging”29 
and “harsh and unforgiving.”30  The Arctic also contains ecologically import-
ant resources such as a “iconic” marine mammals, millions of migratory birds, 
more than 100 species of fish,31 and many endangered species.32  In addition, 
BOEM recognized “the remote nature of the Arctic program areas, the lack of 
widespread infrastructure, and the presence of sea ice for a large part of the 
year also make Arctic coastal zones more vulnerable to impacts from oil spills 
because of the challenges associated with conducting cleanup activities.”33
Despite these many challenges, the Arctic’s lure of “huge, if uncertain, 
oil and gas resource endowments,” especially in the Beaufort Sea and Chuk-
chi Sea,34 alongside Congressional and presidential interests in improving 
infra Part II.D.
26. See Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017); see also infra Part 
I.D for more detailed discussion of Trump’s offshore drilling order.
27. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Report to the Secretary of the Interior, Review 
of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Program 6 (Mar. 8, 2013), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report-3-8-
13-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KJS-NR7Y] [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Review 
of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil And Gas Program].
28. BOEM 2017–2022 OCS Program, supra note 21, at S-2.
29. Pew Env’t Group, Policy Recommendations: Oil Spill Prevention and 
Response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean 2 (2012), https://www.arctic-report.net/wp-content/
uploads/2012/02/PEW-Oil-Spill-Prevention-and-Response-in-the-US-Arctic-Ocean.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BBB2-WBA5] [hereinafter Pew, Policy Recommendations].
30. Jacob D. Unger, Note, Regulating the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory 
Reforms to Protect Alaska’s Arctic Environment From Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31 
Alaska L. Rev. 263, 264 (2014).
31. Pew, Policy Recommendations, supra note 29, at 3.
32. BOEM, 2017–2022 OCS Program, supra note 21, at S-8.
33. Id. at S-9.
34. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2019–2024 National Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing, Draft Proposed Program 6–13 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.
boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019–2024 [https://perma.cc/V95W-9NKL] [herein-
after BOEM, 2019–2024 Draft OCS Program].  Oil and gas potential in Alaska is many 
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U.S. national security by increasing domestic energy supply,35 inspired several 
attempts at Arctic offshore drilling over the last half-century.36  While schol-
ars, journalists, and environmental groups have devoted much attention to the 
risk of offshore oil spills as a result of several catastrophes,37 the challenges 
faced by the Native Villages of Nuiqsut and Point Hope highlight an underdis-
cussed threat that is the focus of this Comment—the air pollution impacts of 
offshore oil and gas drilling on Native Alaskans, and how a disjointed regula-
tory framework for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) air emissions affects those 
communities’ potential for legal recourse.  Part I delineates the evolution of 
drilling in the Arctic OCS.  Part I provides additional detail on the impacts 
of offshore oil and gas development on Native Alaskans and puts their plight 
in the context of the broader environmental justice movement in the United 
States.  Part I also describes the history of how courts have cripplingly lim-
ited the legal tools that environmental justice communities have attempted 
to use over the last four decades.  Part II explores Native Alaskans’ tempo-
rary win achieved through administrative remedies that were available under 
the Clean Air Act before Congress removed EPA’s air permitting authority 
in the Arctic OCS.  Part II analyzes the erratic history of air regulation on the 
OCS, and the differences between the EPA’s OCS regulatory regime under 
the Clean Air Act and BOEM’s regime under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA).  Part II also examines how these different regulations 
and agency structures impact Native Alaskan communities and their ability to 
bring environmental justice-based challenges to OCS development.  Part III 
times greater than in the Atlantic and Pacific.  The Congressional Research Service esti-
mated in 2012, using 2011 BOEM data, that Alaska contains between 1 billion and 22 billion 
barrels of “undiscovered economically recoverable resources,” while the Atlantic only has 1 
billion to 2 billion, the Pacific has 4 billion to 8 billion, and the Gulf of Mexico has 33 to 45 
billion.  Jonathan L. Ramseur, Cong. Research Serv., R42123, Controlling Air Emissions 
from the Outer Continental Shelf: A Comparison of Two Programs—EPA and DOI 3, 
T.1 (2012) [hereinafter Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS]. 
Moreover, in 2018, CRS estimated that, based on a 2015 report from BOEM, the Alaska 
OCS contains “undiscovered, technically recoverable [though not necessarily economically 
viable] resources of approximately 27 billion barrels of oil and 131 trillion cubic feet of nat-
ural gas.”  Cong. Research Serv., R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues 
for Congress 65 (2019) [hereinafter Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic].
35. Cong. Research Serv., R40645, U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Prospects 
and Processes 1 (2012) [hereinafter Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas 
Resources].
36. See infra Part I.
37. These catastrophes include the Exxon Valdez spill off the coast of Alaska in 1989, 
the Santa Barbara spill of 1969, and the Deepwater Horizon spill in the in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010.  See Robin Kundis Craig, Regulation of U.S. Marine Resources: An Overview of the 
Current Complexity, 19 Nat. Res. & Env’t. 3, 7 (2004) (describing how the 1969 oil spill off 
the coast of Santa Barbara, California “continues to haunt some coastal states, like California 
and Florida, that depend heavily upon tourism.”); Henry Fountain, Lessons From the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, N.Y. Times, (Dec. 9, 2013), https://nyti.ms/1bQ8Dp0 [https://perma.cc/8TYX-
VENC] (comparing the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout).
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observes how, while some of the past legal frameworks may have been better 
than others for Native Alaskan communities, none of these past legal frame-
works are truly adequate to address environmental justice.  Accordingly, Part 
III makes recommendations for agencies and Congress to improve legal tools 
to address both air emissions and environmental justice impacts on the OCS.
I. History of Drilling in the Arctic
A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: The Early Years
The United States federal government first established the jurisdiction 
and framework for regulating offshore oil and gas development in federal 
waters with the adoption of the OCSLA in 1953.38  OCSLA, which some 
revered as the “key to a new frontier,”39 set a primary goal of making offshore 
oil and gas resources “available to meet the Nation’s energy needs as rapidly as 
possible.”40  OCSLA directs the Secretary of the Interior (who now delegates 
responsibilities to the BOEM)41 to establish a leasing system over develop-
ment on the OCS—the area extending seaward from state-controlled waters 
(generally three nautical miles off the shoreline)42 out to two hundred nautical 
38. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (2012)).
39. Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New 
Frontier, 6 Stan L. Rev. 23, 23 (1953).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(2)(A) (2012).
41. Mark K. DeSantis, Cong. Research. Serv., R45480, U.S. Department of the 
Interior: An Overview 9 (2019) (explaining that Secretarial Order 3071, issued on January 
19, 1982, delegated OCSLA leasing and management authority to BOEM’s predecessor, the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS), and that authority was redelegated to BOEM after 
its establishment in 2010).
42. A nautical mile is equal to 6,076.12 feet, while a mile over land us 5,280 feet.  Cong. 
Research. Serv., RL33404, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework 2, 
n.11 (2018) [hereinafter Cong. Research. Serv., Offshore Oil and Gas Development]. 
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted most coastal states jurisdiction over submerged 
lands extending three nautical miles from their coastline, but provided for boundary out to 
“three-marine-leagues” (a marine league is the equivalent of 18,228.3 feet, or roughly 3.5 
miles on land) for Gulf of Mexico states that could show such a boundary was provided for 
by the state’s “constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the 
Union, or if it has heretofore been approved by Congress.”  43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2012); see 
also Cong. Research. Serv., Offshore Oil and Gas Development, supra at 2.  As a result 
of litigation following the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, Texas and the Gulf Coast 
of Florida now have state waters extending three-marine-leagues, or roughly nine nautical 
miles, offshore.  Id. at 2, n. 15.
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miles from the U.S. coastline.43  OCS energy leasing occurs in four regions: the 
Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and Alaska.44
In the first two decades after the adoption of OCSLA, little develop-
ment occurred anywhere on the OCS.45  In the 1970s, however, a combination 
of technological advancements, the nation’s growing dependence on oil, and 
an energy crisis prompted Congress and Presidents Nixon and Ford to acceler-
ate OCS development.46  At the same time, the “environmental movement also 
emerged as a vital aspect of our society,”47 inspiring a series of congressional 
moratoria and executive withdrawals48 between 1982 and 2008 that barred oil 
and gas development along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the eastern portion 
of the Gulf of Mexico (off Florida’s coast), and the North Aleutian Basin off 
the western coast of Alaska.49  However, the western Gulf of Mexico and large 
parts of the Alaskan OCS remained legally open for development.
B. The Rise and Fall (and Rise and Fall) of Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development
While robust and consistent oil and gas development and production 
has occurred in the western Gulf of Mexico over the last half-century,50 devel-
opment in the Arctic has been a roller coaster.  A “major oil discovery” first 
occurred in northern Alaska in 1968, but drilling did not begin in earnest in the 
43. See 43 U.S.C. §  1331(a) (defining “outer Continental Shelf”); see also Craig, 
supra note 37, at 4 (describing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III), which allows for signatory coastal nations to claim a two hundred-nautical 
mile “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) for exploiting resources, and how the United States, 
although not a UNCLOS signatory, has claimed a two hundred-nautical mile EEZ “through 
customary international law and presidential proclamations”).
44. Curry L. Hagerty, Cong. Research. Serv., R41132, Outer Continental Shelf 
Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development 1 (2011) [hereinafter Cong. Research Serv., 
OCS Moratoria].
45. Sam Kalen, Cruise Control and Speed Bumps: Energy Policy and Limits for Outer 
Continental Shelf Leasing, 7 Envt’l & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 155, 161 (2012).
46. Id. at 161–62.
47. Id.
48. Areas of the OCS “may be withdrawn by the President under Section 12(a) of the 
OCS lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1341(a)” as well as “under the Antiquities Act, or by Congress by 
such statutes as GOMESA.”  BOEM 2019–2024 Draft OCS Program, supra note 34, at 4–2.
49. See Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra 
note 34, at 8; see also Cong. Research Serv., OCS Moratoria, supra note 44, at 5.  While 
Congress and President George W. Bush allowed most of the moratoria to expire in 2008, 
Congress allowed the North Aleutian Basin moratorium to expire in 2003 at the request of 
the Alaskan Delegation.  Id.
50. For example, as of 2010, there were 3,409 production wells in the Gulf of Mexico, 
while only 23 in the Pacific.  Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the 
OCS, supra note 34, at 1, n. 3 (citing Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Installations and 
Removals—Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters Offshore Production Facilities in 
Federal Waters, http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Offshore-Statsand-Facts/Offshore-
Stats-and-Facts.aspx [https://perma.cc/RX6Z-B7SB]).
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Beaufort and Chukchi Seas until the late 1970s or early 1980s.51  By the mid-
1990s, however, after having drilled thirty-one exploratory wells, the industry 
halted most drilling activities because of “difficult operating conditions,” the 
industry’s failure to find “commercially viable oil deposits,” and “the public 
relations fallout from the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska’s Prince Wil-
liam Sound.”52  After this brief pause, the industry reversed course once again 
in the early 2000s, as high energy prices, rising demand, and interest in Ameri-
can energy independence spurred a renewed focus on Arctic offshore drilling.53 
In 2003, the Alaskan delegation in Congress convinced their peers to allow 
the drilling moratorium in the North Aleutian basin (off of the western coast 
of Alaska) to expire.54  Interest in the Arctic’s oil and gas resources grew even 
stronger in 2008, when the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated 
that offshore areas of the Arctic Circle contain 75 billion barrels of oil (or about 
13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil); 1,402 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas (approximately 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas); and 37 billion 
barrels of natural gas liquids—all “believed to be recoverable using existing 
technology.”55  BOEM estimates that the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas com-
bined contain more than 23 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil and 
106 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.56  Moreover, climate change and melting 
Arctic sea ice has increased the ability for industry to reach these previously 
inaccessible areas.57  The federal government capitalized on the industry’s 
51. See David Hults, Environmental Regulation at the Frontier: Government Oversight 
of Offshore Oil Drilling North of Alaska, 44 Envtl. L. 761, 781–82 (2014) (citing 1981 as 
the starting year for drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
Review of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil And Gas Program, supra note 27, at 8 (citing 
the “late 1970s through the mid-1980s” as the period for when “[m]ost of the exploration 
wells in Federal waters in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas were drilled”).
52. Hults, supra note 51, at 782–83.
53. Michael Levine, Andrew Hartsig, and Maggie Clements, What About BOEM?  The 
Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing, 
31 Alaska L. Rev. 231, 241 (2014); see also Kalen, supra note 45, at 156–58 (discussing the 
reemergence of  American interest in “energy independence” around 2012).
54. Cong. Research Serv., OCS Moratoria, supra note 44, at 7 n.30.
55. U.S. Geological Surv., Fact Sheet 2008–3049, Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle 1 (2008), 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6Q-KR6Q]; see also 
Unger, supra note 30, at 269 (describing the “flurry of new leasing activity” following USGS’s 
report).  The Arctic wasn’t the only region of the OCS that drew renewed attention in 2008—
President George W. Bush also lifted the executive moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific 
Coasts, and Congress allowed the expiration of the moratoria provisions that had historically 
been in annual appropriations laws.  Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions 
from the OCS, supra note 34, at 8.
56. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Review of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil And 
Gas Program, supra note 27, at 7.  The Beaufort Sea contains 8 billion barrels of oil and 28 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, while the Chukchi Sea contains 15 billion barrels of oil and 
78 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  Id.
57. See Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 
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growing interest, holding a highly successful lease sale for the Beaufort Sea in 
2005 and a $2.7 billion lease sale for the Chukchi Sea in 2008, $2.1 billion of 
which was spent by Shell, with the remaining leases going to ConocoPhillips, 
Repsol, and Statoil.58
Arctic OCS development hardly missed a beat when President Obama 
took office in January 2009; he accelerated the oil and gas leasing momentum 
that President George W. Bush had started.  While many remember President 
Obama for protecting most of the Arctic from offshore drilling,59 he did not 
put those protections in place until the final few days of his presidency—after 
he had rammed through approvals for Arctic OCS development and after the 
industry tried and failed to develop the area.60  Although President Obama 
had been “hesitant” toward Arctic drilling during the initial phases of his 
presidential campaign, strategic lobbying by Shell won him over by midsum-
mer of 2008.61
Before Arctic drilling could reach full throttle, however, the 2010 Deepwa-
ter Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico “killed 11 rig workers and unleashed 
an undersea gusher  .  .  .  that took three months to cap.”62  In response, the 
Obama Administration cancelled several planned lease sales in the Atlantic, 
Pacific, and Alaskan OCS.63  The Obama Administration also issued a mor-
atorium on other approvals64 while it launched “the most aggressive and 
comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation and oversight in U.S. 
34, at 3; Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic, supra note 34, at 22–25 (discussing 
climate change and loss of sea ice in the Arctic); Edith Allison & Ben Mandler, Petroleum 
and the Environment, The American Geosciences Institute §  12-1 (2018), https://www.
americangeosciences.org/sites/default/files/AGI_PetroleumEnvironment_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6965-CUWA].
58. Hults, supra note 51, at 783.
59. Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic 
Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing, 2016 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Dec. 20, 
2016). President Obama also “separately withdrew from leasing consideration planning 
areas in the North Bering Sea.”  Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic supra note 
34, at 67 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669 (Dec. 9, 2016)).
60. For a discussion of President Obama’s involvement in pushing forward approvals 
for Shell’s drilling, see infra, Parts I.B–C; see also John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, New 
and Frozen Frontier Awaits Offshore Oil Drilling, N.Y. Times (May 23, 2012), https://nyti.ms/ 
2tGZ86I [https://perma.cc/N3EG-WZUQ].  President Obama issued two withdrawals from 
waters off of Alaska in December 2016.  See Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic, 
supra note 34, at 67 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669 (Dec. 9, 2016)).
61. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60.
62. Matt Smith, Shell’s Arctic Dreams Postponed Another Year, CNN (Jan. 30, 2014, 
4:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/30/us/shell-arctic [https://perma.cc/92PM-QGZQ].
63. Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Resources, supra note 35, at 2.
64. See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, 
Report to the President 152 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter Deep Water] (explaining that on May 
27, 2010, Interior “Secretary Salazar directed MMS to issue a six-month moratorium on all 
drilling at a water depth of more than 500 feet in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean”).
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history.”65  These reforms included updating safety regulations and reorganiz-
ing the Minerals Management Service (MMS)—the division of the Department 
of the Interior that had managed most aspects of OCS development.66  After 
acknowledging the problems that can arise from one agency managing “three 
conflicting missions,” the Secretary of the Interior divided MMS into three 
separate entities with three independent missions: (1) BOEM would manage 
energy development and leasing; (2) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE) would handle safety and environmental responsibility; 
and (3) the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) would ensure a fair 
return to the taxpayer from offshore royalties.67
C. Shell’s Arctic Offshore Drilling Efforts
Independent of the Deepwater Horizon aftermath, but later that same 
year, the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board revoked an air permit that 
Shell needed under the Clean Air Act in order to operate in the Arctic OCS. 
68  The Board found that the EPA had inadequately examined the impact of 
Shell’s air emissions on Native Alaskan communities.69
Ironically, it was these development slowdowns—which occurred in 
response to the serious environmental and public health concerns sparked by 
Shell’s Arctic proposals and Deepwater Horizon—that prompted President 
Obama to “put his foot on the gas” for Arctic OCS drilling.70  Following unre-
lenting lobbying by Mark Begich, a freshman Senator from Alaska who was a 
“crucial Democratic vote in a narrowly divided Senate representing a decid-
edly Republican state”, President Obama, in the summer of 2011, “created an 
unusual interagency group . . . to clear Shell’s path through the often fractious 
federal regulator bureaucracy.”71  Shell had also won unlikely supporters in 
Washington by making a strategic decision to “abandon its oil industry breth-
ren and join advocates for a strong response to climate change.” 72  At the 
65. Regulatory Reforms, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, https://www.boem.
gov/Regulatory-Reform [https://perma.cc/F7J7-YWHN].
66. Id.
67. See Press Release, Dep’t of The Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting 
Missions: Establishes Independent Agency to Police Offshore Energy Operations (May 19, 
2010), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-
Missions [https://perma.cc/RYW5-F57V]; The Reorganization of the Former MMS, Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management, https://www.boem.gov/Reorganization [https://perma.cc/
S5UW-6U8B].
68. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647 (EAB 2010); see also 
infra Parts II.C and III.E for more detailed discussions of regulations controlling on air emis-
sions in the OCS.
69. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *3 (EAB 2010).
70. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60 (explaining that the 2010 Environmental Appeals 
Board decision “infuriated Shell executives, frustrated White House officials and unleashed 
the ire of Alaska’s two senators, who introduced legislation to streamline permitting.”).
71. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41987 (July 15, 2011).
72. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60.
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same time, the company built support for its Arctic oil drilling among some 
Native Alaskans by donating to a local college’s Inupiaq language program, 
financing equipment for Native whaling crews, paying for village celebra-
tions, and sending a “personable executive” who traveled to remote villages, 
held  company-sponsored meetings, passed out raffle tickets and food, joined 
in Native dances, and chewed on the “the local delicacy—raw whale meat.”73 
Meanwhile, the perceived need for the United States to attain energy inde-
pendence and increase domestic oil production had become a key issue in 
the 2012 U.S. presidential campaigns.  This prompted President Obama in his 
January 2012 State of the Union Address to announce that his administra-
tion would be opening approximately 75 percent of the nation’s offshore oil 
and gas resources for development.74  By March 2012, Shell had the approv-
als it needed for Arctic OCS drilling: an exploration permit from BOEM and 
a revised air permit approved by the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board.75
In actual operation, however, Shell’s venture into the Arctic OCS was 
anything but smooth.  In 2012, the company had a “disastrous first year” that 
included running one of its drill ships aground and racking up $1.1 million 
in fines for violating its air permits.76  In 2013, Shell suspended plans to drill 
in Arctic waters,77 then announced its intent in May 2015 to reinitiate Arctic 
drilling,78 only to reverse course again in September 2015, when the company 
announced it would “cease further exploration activity in offshore Alaska 
for the foreseeable future,” citing insufficient oil resources.79  In December 
2016, after Shell and other companies “relinquished more than 90 percent of 
[Beaufort and Chukchi Sea] Arctic OCS leases” between February 2016 and 
November 2016,80 President Obama invoked his authority under Section 12(a) 
of OCSLA81 to indefinitely withdraw from leasing a large portion of the Arctic 
OCS, including the entire Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea planning areas.82  In 
73. Id.
74. Kalen, supra note 45, at 156–58.
75. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60; see also Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 
2012 WL 119962, at *34 (EAB 2012) (approving the EPA’s revised environmental justice 
analysis for Shell’s OCS air permits).
76. Joanna M. Foster, Shell Suspends 2014 Offshore Drilling Plans in Arctic, 
ThinkProgress, (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:44 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/shell-suspends-2014- 
offshore-drilling-plans-in-arctic-4638f5370618 [https://perma.cc/SVZ3-V8US]; see also 
Smith, supra note 62.
77. See Foster, supra note 76; see also Smith, supra note 62.
78. See Daniel Gilbert & Sarah Kent, Shell Places Huge Bet on Arctic Oil Riches, 
Wall St. J. (July 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-places-huge-bet-on-arctic-oil-
riches-1436311938 [https://perma.cc/V93W-7WDY].
79. Press Release, Shell Global, Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration (Sept. 28, 
2015), https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2015/shell-updates-on-alaska- 
exploration.html [https://perma.cc/2DSM-WYEE].
80. BOEM, 2017–2022 OCS Program, supra note 21, at S-3.
81. 43 U.S.C. 1341(a) (2012).
82. Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic 
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essence, President Obama fired the oil industry from the Arctic OCS after they 
had already quit.  Nonetheless, environmental groups were “thrilled.”83
D. Arctic Offshore Drilling under President Trump
The Arctic’s OCS hiatus was shortlived.  In April 2017, President Trump 
announced a new “America-First Offshore Energy Strategy” with Executive 
Order 13795, which revoked most of President Obama’s withdrawals, reopened 
almost all of the Arctic OCS for leasing, and ordered the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to schedule oil and gas lease sales “to the maximum extent permitted” in 
the Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and Cook Inlet, as well as the western and cen-
tral Gulf of Mexico, Mid-Atlantic, and South Atlantic.84  Since then, the Trump 
Administration has approved two permits to drill in the Beaufort Sea, one 
in November 201785 and one in October 2018.86  In addition, in January 2018, 
BOEM proposed a new offshore leasing program for 2019 to 2024 to replace 
the Obama Administration’s 2017 to 2022 program.87
The future of these plans, however, is now highly tenuous.  In March 2019, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska reinstated President Obama’s 
Arctic OCS withdrawal and overturned President Trump’s attempted reversal, 
finding that OCSLA gives presidents the power only to withdraw areas of the 
OCS from leasing, and only Congress has the power to add areas for leasing.88 
Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing, 2016 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Dec. 20, 
2016). President Obama also “separately withdrew from leasing consideration planning 
areas in the North Bering Sea.”  Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic supra note 
34, at 67 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669 (Dec. 9, 2016)).
83. Brad Plumer, Obama Tries to Preempt Trump by Banning Oil Drilling in Parts of the 
Arctic and Atlantic, Vox (Dec. 20, 2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/12/20/14032588/
obama-oil-drilling-arctic-trump [https://perma.cc/3S5A-AUTA].
84. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
85. Cong. Research Serv., Changes in the Arctic, supra note 34, at 66 (citing Press 
Release, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), “BSEE Approves New 
Drilling Operations in Arctic,” (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/latest-news/
statements-and-releases/press-releases/bsee-approves-new-drilling-operations-in [https://
perma.cc/4ZLC-38D5]).  The BSEE Director stated in the press release that “responsible 
resource development in the Arctic is a critical component to achieving American energy 
dominance.”  Id.
86. Darryl Fears, The Trump Administration Just Approved a Plan to Drill for Oil in 
Alaska’s Federal Waters.  It’s a Major First., Wash. Post (Oct. 24, 2018, 3:26 PM),
https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/20 18/10/24/trump-
administration-just-approved-plan-drill-oil-alaskas-federal-waters-its-major-first/?utm_ 
term=.470f234d13d4 [https://perma.cc/6GRE-ZDP2].  This approval is now under review 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, after environmental groups brought a 
lawsuit in December 2018.  Lawsuit Challenges Trump Approval of Offshore Drilling Project 
in the Arctic, Earthjustice (Dec. 17, 2018), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2018/lawsuit-
challenges-approval-of-offshore-oil-drilling-project-in-the-arctic [https://perma.cc/CW9Y-
56VB].
87. BOEM, 2019–2024 Draft OCS Program, supra note 34, at 4–1.
88. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1030 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 29, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-35462 (9th Cir. May 29, 2019).
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However, this decision is now under appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit,89 once again putting in question the fate of Arctic drilling 
and the wellbeing of Native Alaskans, such as those in the Villages of Nuiqsut 
and Point Hope.
Figure 1: Areas Targeted for Drilling by the Trump Administration, But Under Legal 
Dispute90
E. The Missing Issue in Arctic Offshore Drilling: Environmental Justice
Native Alaskans have already shown they’re not willing to let Arctic oil 
and gas expansion happen without a fight.  In the past decade, Native Alaskans 
have had some success in delaying onshore and offshore oil and gas develop-
ment by bringing claims in federal court under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA).  In multiple such cases, the courts found that the federal 
agencies failed to take a “hard look” at projects’ effects on wildlife as a part of 
the environmental review required by NEPA.91  With respect to challenging the 
89. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 19-35462 (9th Cir. Docketed May 29, 
2019).
90. Map Source: Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards: Recommendations 
on Oil Spill Prevention, Response, and Safety in the U.S. Arctic Ocean 6 (2013) (cir-
cles added), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/09/23/arcticstandardsfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T26R-SMBF].
91. See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 1:08-CV-0004-RRB, 2010 WL 2943120, 
at *7 (D. Alaska July 21, 2010), order clarified, No. 1:08-CV-0004-RRB, 2010 WL 3025163 (D. 
Alaska Aug. 2, 2010) (finding the Department of Interior’s environmental review on an off-
shore lease to Shell in the Chukchi Sea had inadequately examined the lease’s impacts on 
wildlife and subsistence); see also Kunaknana v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 23 F. Supp. 
3d 1063, 1099 (D. Alaska 2014) (reviewing the Army Corps’ issuance of a permit under the 
Clean Water Act related ConocoPhillips’ oil and gas development in the National Petroleum 
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direct impacts of offshore drilling on the Native Alaskans themselves, however, 
successes were few and far between and appeared to be an inviable option92—
that is, until 2010.  In that year, the Native Village of Point Hope and other 
environmental justice plaintiffs successfully delayed Shell’s ability to obtain 
two air permits required by the Clean Air Act to drill in the Chukchi and Beau-
fort Seas.93  The EPA Environmental Appeals Board ruled in Shell Gulf of 
Mexico that the EPA had not adequately considered the impacts of nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) emissions on environmental justice communities (Native Alas-
kans), thereby violating a 1994 executive order from President Clinton that 
requires federal agencies to address the environmental justice impacts of their 
activities.94
The Shell decision had the potential to be a turning point for environ-
mental justice communities, particularly Native Alaskans, to challenge offshore 
oil and gas development based on the disproportionate health impacts of air 
emissions on their people.  However, in 2011, Congress and President Obama 
quietly extinguished this option by passing an Appropriations Act provision 
that eliminated the Clean Air Act’s requirement that Arctic OCS development 
obtain an air emissions permit from the EPA.95  To add insult to injury, the EPA 
Environmental Appeals Board approved Shell’s revised air permits in 2012, as 
one of the Board’s final actions over Arctic OCS drilling.96  Now, Native Alas-
kans have a severely limited ability to effectively challenge offshore oil and gas 
projects based on environmental justice concerns related to air pollution.  The 
next Part of this Comment takes a closer look at the concept of environmental 
justice and related legal options.
II. Environmental Justice—From North Carolina to the Outer 
Continental Shelf
A. Introduction to Environmental Justice
The Village of Nuiqsut’s story of industrial pollution infiltrating a low-in-
come community of color and wreaking havoc on their health is not unique. 
Rather, it is emblematic of the situation countless communities of color face 
throughout the United States and the world.  This trend is called environmental 
Reserve, and finding that the Army Corps failed to provide a reasoned explanation for why a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was not needed to take into account project 
changes and new information such as new climate change science).
92. See infra Part II, for legal history of lawsuits based on “environmental justice” and 
background on environmental justice.
93. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *32 (EAB 2010).
94. Id. at 148, 161 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994)). For 
historical and legal background on “environmental justice,” see infra Part II.A.  For further 
discussion of Shell and Executive Order 12898, see infra Part II.D.
95. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, P.L. 112–74, § 432, 125 Stat. 786, 1048–49 
(adopted Dec. 23, 2011) (amending Section 328 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7627).
96. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *34 (EAB 2012).
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injustice or environmental racism.  The inverse of environmental racism is 
environmental justice.97  The EPA defines “environmental justice” as “the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, 
national origin or income with respect to the development, implementation 
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.”98
Environmental justice advocates and scholars generally attribute the 
birth of the environmental justice movement to a series of incidents wherein 
hazardous facilities were being located in low-income, predominantly black 
communities, beginning in North Carolina and spreading to other southeast-
ern states throughout the 1980s.99  These incidents ignited outrage and protests, 
and led the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability 
Office) and the United Church of Christ Commission (UCC) for Racial Jus-
tice to commission groundbreaking studies examining environmental injustice 
in southeastern states,100 and the entire country, respectively.101  Notably, the 
UCC’s 1987 report found that race was “the most significant of variables tested 
in association with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.”102  In 
fact, the UCC’s report found race was a more significant factor than socioeco-
nomic status in hazardous facilities citing.103  A 1994 update to the UCC study 
found that “people of color are 47 percent more likely to live near a hazard-
ous waste facility than white Americans.”104  Since then, “study after study” has 
reconfirmed that “people of color face disproportionate risks from pollution, 
and that polluting industries are often located in the middle of their commu-
nities.”105  Even the EPA under the Trump Administration released a study 
97. Environmental Justice/Environmental Racism, Energy Just. Network, https://
www.ejnet.org/ej [https://perma.cc/LS7E-EAWL].
98. Learn About Environmental Justice, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.
gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/AVC7-HJ57].
99. The first incident in the “environmental justice movement” is usually listed as the 
citing of a highly toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) landfill in Warren County, North 
Carolina, which was 84 percent African American and one of the poorest counties in the state. 
See, e.g. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, FN 13–14 (Oct. 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights 2013 EJ Report]; Haydn Davies, From Equal Protection to Private Law, 2 Brit. 
J. Am. Legal Stud. 163, 164–65 (Spring 2013); Robert D. Bullard et al., Toxic Waste and Race 
at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After All of These Years, 38 Envtl. L. 371, 373 (2008).
100. See Davies, supra note 99, at 165.
101. See Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr. & Charles Lee, Comm’n For Racial Justice, United 
Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States (1987), http://www.ucc.
org/about-us/archives/pdfs/toxwrace87.pdf [https://perma.cc/56WS-RP8Z].
102. Id. at xiii.
103. Id.
104. Bullard et al., supra note 99 (citing Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Center 
for Policy Alternatives and the United Church of Christ, Commission for Racial 
Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited: An Update of the 1987 Report on the Racial 
and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 2–4 
(1994)).
105. Vann R. Newkirk II, Trump’s EPA Concludes Environmental Racism Is Real, 
The Atlantic (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/
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in 2018 acknowledging not only that “people in poverty are exposed to more 
fine particulate matter than people living above poverty,” but that “non-Whites 
tend to be burdened disproportionately to Whites.”106
B. Disproportionate Impacts of Offshore Drilling on Native Alaskans
The federal government recognizes Native Americans and populations 
with a subsistence lifestyle as “environmental justice” communities, in other 
words, communities that face “disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects” of pollution.107  Native Alaskans have a com-
plicated history with the oil industry.  Native Alaskans have come to rely on the 
industry for jobs, tax revenue, and the development of key infrastructure such 
as electricity, running water, roads, fire stations, and schools.108  At the same 
time, proposals to drill offshore, in particular, collide with Native Alaskans’ 
cultural view of the ocean as their “garden”—their source of food.109  Native 
Alaskan communities, such as the Iñupiat along the Beaufort and Chukchi 
Seas, “depend largely on the natural environment, especially the marine envi-
ronment, for food and materials.”110  The Native Village of Nuiqsut estimates 
that over eighty percent of its residents are Iñupiat Eskimos who “practice 
a traditional subsistence lifestyle.”111  These traditional “subsistence activi-
ties, including fishing and hunting  .  .  .  take the Inupiat far from their local 
villages.” 112  In fact, some of the northern Iñupiat communities, including Nuiq-
sut residents, “have traveled up to sixty miles offshore . . . to hunt for bowhead 
the-trump-administration-finds-that-environmental-racism-is-real/554315 [https://perma.
cc/5VSD-JEMQ]; see also Environmental Justice/Environmental Racism, Energy Justice 
Network, https://www.ejnet.org/ej [https://perma.cc/LS7E-EAWL] (listing more than a 
dozen studies documenting environmental racism and classism).
106. See Newkirk II, supra note 105.
107. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). § 6–606 explains 
that this “environmental justice” order “shall apply equally to Native American programs.” 
§  4–401 discusses the “need for ensuring protection of populations with differential pat-
terns of subsistence consumption of fish and wildlife.”  Id. at § 4–401, § 6–606; see also U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Policy on Environmental Justice for Working with 
Federally Recognized Tribes and Indigenous Peoples 1 (2014), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/ production/files/2017-10/documents/ej-indigenous-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EC8-
3U2W].
108. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60.
109. Id.
110. BOEM, 2019–2024 Draft OCS Program, supra note 34, at 7–6 (explaining that 
“fish (e.g. cod, herring, whitefish, Arctic cisco, Arctic char, and salmon), ringed seals, bearded 
seals, and beluga whales are all important marine subsistence species” for Alaska Native 
peoples).
111. Brubaker, supra note 19; see also BOEM, 2019–2024 Draft OCS Program, supra 
note 34, at 6–18 (citing an Alaska Department of Fish and Game study which “found that 
63 percent of households in the Arctic harvested game, and 92 percent of households used 
game.”).
112. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *31 n.80 (EAB 2010) 
(internal quotes and citations omitted).
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whale.”113  “Kaktovik residents have traveled as far as thirty-five miles offshore 
to hunt for bowhead whale and walrus,” which are their “traditional subsis-
tence food sources.”114  As a result, BOEM has acknowledged that drilling in 
Arctic waters presents “possible conflicts” with the subsistence hunting and 
fishing activities of Native communities.115
Moreover, the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board has recognized that 
air emissions from offshore oil and gas development present a unique threat 
to Native Alaskans because their subsistence activities of offshore fishing and 
hunting require them to “spend extended periods of time closer to the emis-
sions sources.”116  Air emissions come from a variety of sources and activities 
related to oil and gas drilling on the OCS and can vary in type and intensity 
depending on the needs of the location and operation.117  Offshore drilling has 
advanced over the last century “from drilling rigs mounted on shoreline piers, 
to rigid platforms mounted on the seafloor, to floating and seafloor systems 
in water depths up to 10,000 feet.”118  Sources of air emissions may include 
diesel engines used to drill exploratory or development wells, “supply and tug 
boat engines, natural gas turbines (used during production to operate platform 
facilities), leakage of vapors from pump and compressor seals and storage 
tanks, and flaring of excess gas.”119  In addition, Arctic oil and gas exploration 
requires certain types of mobile vessels such as ice breakers, oil spill support 
113. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *18, n.32 (EAB 2012).
114. Id.
115. BOEM, 2017–2022 OCS Program, supra note 21, at S-10.
116. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *31 n.80 (EAB 2010) 
(internal quotes and citations omitted).
117. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 4.
118. Allison & Mandler, supra note 57, at 13-1.
119. William Cohen & Jack Haugrud, Environmental Considerations in Outer-
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing in the United States, 3 Tulane Envtl. L.J. 1, 6 (1990). 
For example, BOEM’s Environmental Impact Statement for the recently approved (2018) 
“Liberty Development” in the Beaufort Sea, 60 miles east of the Village of Nuiqsut, listed its 
relevant air emissions sources as:
1) mobile sources associated with proposed LDPI and offshore pipeline con-
struction activities;
2) mobile sources associated with onshore facilities and pipeline construction 
activities;
3) stationary sources associated with drilling operations;
4) stationary sources associated with production operations;
5) propulsion and auxiliary engines operated onboard vessels;
6) helicopters and light aircraft; and
7) mobile and stationary sources associated with accidental oil spills and gas 
releases.
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Liberty Development and Production Plan, 
Beaufort Alaska, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Vol. 1, at 4–33 (Aug. 2018) 
[hereinafter BOEM, Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS], https://www.
boem.gov/Vol-1-Liberty-FEIS [https://perma.cc/3LUD-KBED].
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vessels, and trucks that operate over ice—all of which emit high amounts of 
pollution and need to be used more often because of the unique climate of the 
Arctic.120  As a result, emissions from mobile sources supporting OCS drilling 
facilities are even more impactful in the Arctic than other areas of the OCS, 
notwithstanding the fact that mobile source emissions have increased through-
out the OCS as drilling moves farther from the shore.121  Mobile sources are 
now responsible for eighty percent of oil and gas exploration and production 
emissions in the Alaskan OCS, while they account for 55 percent of emissions 
in the Gulf of Mexico OCS.122
Emissions from offshore drilling projects can include: nitrogen oxide 
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2),  particulate matter (fine 
particles PM2.5 and coarse particles, PM10), lead (Pb), volatile organic com-
pounds (VOCs), and greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O).123  Nitrogen oxide, carbon 
monoxide, sulphur dioxide, particulate matter, and lead are all listed by the 
EPA as “criteria” pollutants under Clean Air Act, meaning that they have the 
potential to harm human health and the environment.124
Particulate matter, which is a “mixture of solid particles and liquid 
droplets found in the air,” is concerning for human health because parti-
cles less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PM10) can lodge deep into lungs 
and the bloodstream “and cause serious health problems.” 125  Such problems 
include premature death in people with heart or lung disease, nonfatal heart 
attacks, irregular heartbeats, aggravated asthma, decreased lung function, and 
“increased respiratory symptoms, such as irritation of the airways, coughing or 
difficulty breathing.”126  In fact, particulate matter is so detrimental that even 
the American Trucking Association—in a challenge against Clean Air Act reg-
ulations—told the U.S. Supreme Court that “particulate matter  .  .  .  inflict[s] 
120. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
19,717, 19,736 (proposed Apr. 5, 2016); see also Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air 
Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, at 4.
121. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg at 
19,736.
122. Id.
123. BOEM, Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS, supra note 119, at 
4–32.
124. Criteria Air Pollutants, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/crite-
ria-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/J8J5-E25L].  The name “criteria pollutants” comes from 
the fact that the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to adopt National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants that the EPA determines, based on scientific “air 
quality criteria,” harm human health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
125. Particulate Matter (PM) Pollution, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics#PM [https://perma.cc/LCK2-S7CF].
126. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects- particulate-
matter-pm [https://perma.cc/RV66-NQ5F].
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a continuum of adverse health effects at any airborne concentration greater 
than zero.”127
Lead can also have serious longterm health impacts because, once lead 
enters the body, it “distributes throughout the body in the blood and is accu-
mulated in the bones” and can “adversely affect the nervous system, kidney 
function, immune system, reproductive and development systems and the car-
diovascular system” in people of all ages, as well as lower the IQ of children.128 
In terms of volume, however, lead emissions from OCS sources are small.129
Nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide are the air pollutants that OCS 
activities most abundantly produce.130  For example, Shell’s air permit for drill-
ing in the Chukchi Sea in 2012 “allowed the [drillship] and its support vessels 
to emit 336 tons of NOx, 154 tons of carbon monoxide, and 43 tons of par-
ticulate matter, or soot, during the summer drilling season  .  .  .  roughly the 
same emissions generated by a fleet of 300,000 cars operating for a full year.”131 
Large emissions of NOx are concerning because longterm exposure to NOx 
can “contribute to the development of asthma” or respiratory infections, while 
even shortterm exposure “can aggravate respiratory diseases, particularly 
asthma, leading to respiratory symptoms (such as coughing, wheezing or diffi-
culty breathing), hospital admissions, and visits to emergency rooms.”132
C. Legal Tools for Addressing Environmental Justice—A History of Closed 
Doors
Environmental justice advocates have tried a number of legal avenues 
to challenge polluting projects that disproportionately impact communities of 
color.  However, over the last nearly half-century, courts have closed off many 
of those avenues.
127. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
128. Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://
www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-information-about-lead-air-pollution#health [https://
perma.cc/AG3S-H3HY].
129. For example, BOEM’s Environmental Impact Statement for the “Liberty 
Development” in the Beaufort Sea concluded that “lead emissions from the project would 
not cause nor contribute to a violation of the lead National Atmospheric Air Quality 
Standards” because “[n]one of the fuels used for the project contain lead additives and only 
trace levels of lead would originate from equipment lubricants containing lead or engine 
wear.  BOEM, Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS, supra note 119, at 4–33.
130. See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, BOEM 2016–060, Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program: 2017–2022, Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement, Vol. 1, at 4–88 (Nov. 2016); see also Cong. Research 
Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, at 4.
131. Beilinson, supra note 20.
132. Basic Information about NO2, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
no2-pollution/basic-information-about-no2#Effects [https://perma.cc/2XH3-EYD6].
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1. Civil Rights-Based Environmental Justice Litigation
Many parties have attempted to challenge polluting projects with claims 
that the projects’ disparate impact on communities of color violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution133 or Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which bars discrimination by any entity that receives or spends 
federal funds.134  Those challenges have been largely unsuccessful, however, 
and “the door to environmental justice litigation based on disparate racial jus-
tice impact was gradually closed by [a series of Supreme Court cases] so that 
absent strong evidence of racial motivation, evidence of racial impact now has 
little purchase in litigation.”135
Although the Supreme Court removed the possibility of using courts to 
vindicate Title VI claims based on discriminatory effect (rather than intent), Title 
VI still provides an avenue for any person to bring administrative complaints 
to federal agencies when a federally funded program or activity allegedly dis-
criminates (in effect or intentionally) based on race, color, or national origin.136 
For such claims involving the EPA, complaints may allege—pursuant to EPA 
regulations—that the EPA or a recipient of EPA assistance discriminated in 
“purpose or effect” in administering its programs or in siting a facility.137  EPA 
regulations also require the EPA Office of Civil Rights to “promptly investi-
gate” and respond within 20 days to civil rights complaints.138  Notwithstanding 
these regulations, studies have found that the EPA Office of Civil Rights rarely 
133. The Equal Protection Clause provides that states may not “Deny any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
134. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§  2000d-2000d-4a (2012). 
§ 2000d of the Civil Rights Act requires that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”  § 2000d-1 provides that “[e]ach Federal department and agency which 
is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of 
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and 
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title.”
135. See Davies, supra note 99, at 196.  For an excellent review of the keystone Supreme 
Court cases closing the door to environmental justice lawsuits under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, see id. at 171–78.
136. See Office of Environmental Justice, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Title VI and 
Executive Order 12898 Comparison (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/title-vi-ej-comparison.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4RUV-L6JC]; see also Title VI and Environmental Justice, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/title-vi-and-environmental-justice 
[https://perma.cc/W3DK-7E74].
137. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2018) (emphasis added) (“A recipient shall not choose a site 
or location of a facility that has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from, denying 
them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any program or activity to 
which this part applies on the grounds of race, color, or national origin or sex; or with the pur-
pose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of 
this subpart.”).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(1)(i) (2018).
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reviews complaints,139 and when it does it almost never finds in favor of the 
complainant.140  As a result, environmental justice advocates have called the 
EPA’s response to Title VI complaints “slow[] and poor[]”141 and “anemic.”142
2. Statutory Causes of Action—The Clean Air Act, Take 1
After the virtual failure of attempts to apply civil rights laws to envi-
ronmental justice cases, environmental justice advocates “recognized that the 
best protection may prove to be within the environmental laws themselves.”143 
One such statutory avenue is the Clean Air Act, which is the federal law that 
“defines EPA’s responsibilities for protecting and improving the nation’s air 
quality.”144  The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to adopt National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants that the EPA determines, 
based on scientific “air quality criteria,” harm human health and welfare.145 
The pollutants regulated under the NAAQS program are the “criteria pollut-
ants” described above in Part III.B (particulate matter, ozone, sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead).146  The Clean Air Act also autho-
rizes the development of federal and state regulations to limit emissions from 
major stationary sources and mobile sources, and requires states to adopt 
enforceable plans (State Implementation Plans (SIPs)) to attain and main-
tain the NAAQS.147  Relevant to many environmental justice lawsuits is the 
Clean Air Act’s requirement that major new stationary sources of air pollution 
139. As of 2011, only 6 percent of Title VI complaints were reviewed within the legally 
required timeframe.  See Davies, supra note 99, at 177.
140. In fact, between 1993 and 2015, the Office of Civil Rights “hadn’t made a finding 
of discrimination . . . despite having received hundreds of complaints.”  Talia Buford, Rare 
Discrimination Finding by EPA Civil-Rights Office, The Center for Public Integrity (Jan. 
25, 2017), https://publicintegrity.org/environment/rare-discrimination-finding-by-epa- civil-
rights-office [https://perma.cc/G76R-WE5E].
141. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Earthjustice, https://earthjustice.org/ 
features/what-you-need-to-know-about-title-vi [https://perma.cc/S2GH-N7AG].
142. Buford, supra note 140.
143. Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA 
Permitting Authority, 26 Ecology L.Q. 617, 618–19 (1999); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 
Office of General Counsel, Memorandum, EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities 
Under Which Environmental Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting 10–14 
(Dec. 1, 2000) (discussing EPA’s authority to incorporate environmental justice into Clean 
Air Act permitting).
144. Clean Air Act Overview, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-
act-overview/clean-air-act-text [https://perma.cc/CPQ8-3CCY].
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
146. Criteria Air Pollutants, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/crite-
ria-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/J8J5-E25L].
147. See 42 U.S.C. §§  7407–7671q (2012); see also Clean Air Act Requirements and 
History, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act- 
requirements-and-history#text [https://perma.cc/9Q2R-XHXH]; Evolution of the Clean Air 
Act, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-
air-act [https://perma.cc/VL82-AC8N].
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obtain a preconstruction permit and install technology-based pollution con-
trols in compliance either with the nonattainment new source review program 
(if the source’s location is in “non-attainment” with the NAAQS), or with the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program (if the location is in 
“attainment” with the NAAQS or is “unclassifiable”).148  Major new station-
ary sources of air emissions can include OCS facilities such as drillships or rigs 
located in some areas of the OCS.149
As Part III will discuss in more detail, the Clean Air Act’s applicability 
to offshore oil and gas development has vacillated over time.150  The important 
point here is that the Clean Air Act’s utility in promoting environmental jus-
tice has also evolved over time.  Although scholars and the EPA now recognize 
that the Clean Air Act provides many “opportunities to integrate environmen-
tal justice concerns into the Act’s substantive standards,”151 early on the Clean 
Air Act was not an effective tool to promote environmental justice.  Prior to the 
issuance of President Clinton’s environmental justice Executive Order 12898 
in 1994, the EPA and its Environmental Appeals Board took the position that 
the Agency could not even consider environmental justice concerns in an air 
quality permitting process.152  That position changed, however, following the 
issuance of Executive Order 12898, as will be discussed in the next Subpart.
148. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Air Act in a Nutshell 4–9 (Mar. 22, 2013), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/caa_nutshell.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7T82-SV8M]; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7503 (2012) (permit requirement in nonattain-
ment areas), 7472 (classifications of areas under the PSD program), and 7475 (preconstruc-
tion requirements under the PSD program).
149. Clean Air Act Section 328, 42 U.S.C. §  7627(a) (2012) (requiring the EPA to 
“establish requirements to control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources . . . to 
attain and maintain Federal and State ambient air quality standards and to comply with the 
provisions of [the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program]”); see also infra Part III 
for additional history on the oscillating requirements pertaining to OCS.
150. See infra Part III.
151. Lazarus & Tai, supra note 143, at 631; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of 
General Counsel, Memorandum, EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities Under 
Which Environmental Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting 10–14 (Dec. 1, 
2000) (describing the provisions of the Clean Air Act that allow the EPA to impose per-
mitting requirements based on environmental justice concerns); EPA Activities to Promote 
Environmental Justice in the Permit Application Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,220 (May 9, 2013) 
(providing a “notice of availability of regional actions to promote public participation in 
the permitting process and promising practices for permit applicants seeking EPA-issued 
permits,” including permits issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act).  See generally EJ 2020 
Action Agenda: EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.
epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ej-2020-action-agenda-epas-environmental-justice-strategy 
[https://perma.cc/8MXZ-XFK9].
152. Lazarus & Tai, supra note 143, at 656 (citing Genesee Power Station, 4 E.A.D. 832, 
837 (EAB 1993) (requiring proof of “racially discriminatory intent”)).
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3. President Clinton’s Environmental Justice Executive Order 12898
In 1994, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order requiring fed-
eral agencies to address environmental justice, which had a “marked effect” on 
the EPA’s and the Environmental Appeals Board’s approach to considering 
environmental justice in permitting.153  Executive Order 12898 provides that:
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law . . . each Federal 
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and 
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, 
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.154
With respect to considering offshore oil and gas development, Execu-
tive Order 12898 created the potential for environmental justice to come into 
play in a few different stages: (a) in the environmental analysis that NEPA155 
requires during each of the four stages of offshore planning, leasing, explor-
ing, or drilling under OCSLA;156 or (b) during the EPA’s OCS air permitting 
processes, if such a permit is required for the particular OCS area.157  As 
153. Id.
154. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1–101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
155. NEPA is the federal law requiring analysis of the environmental impacts of federal 
actions. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)).  In a memorandum to the heads of 
departments accompanying Executive Order 12,898, President Clinton instructed agencies to 
analyze the environmental justice impacts of Federal actions when such analysis is required 
by NEPA, and to provide environmental justice communities with the opportunity to partic-
ipate in the NEPA process.  Memorandum for the Heads of All Departments and Agencies. 
30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 279, 280  (Feb. 11, 1994).  The Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ)—the entity within the Office of the President responsible for providing baseline 
NEPA regulations for all federal agencies—reiterated these instructions in a guidance doc-
ument in 1997.  Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice Guidance 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 1997).  However, the CEQ’s NEPA 
regulations do not mention “environmental justice,” or “minority,” or Executive Order 
12,898, except in a requirement which bars projects with environmental justice impacts from 
being “categorically excluded” from NEPA review altogether. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2018).
156. Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), offshore oil and gas 
development occurs in four stages: (1) BOEM develops a five-year leasing program for the 
entire OCS; (2) BOEM holds lease sales for individual areas scheduled in the five-year plan; 
(3) lessees apply to “explore”; and (4) lessees submit an Application to Drill or approval of a 
Development and Production Plan (DPP).  Andrew Hartsig et al., Next Steps to Reform the 
Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing, 33 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 5 (2016) (citing 
43 U.S.C. § 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, 1351 (2012)); see also Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Offshore 
Oil and Gas Resources, supra note 35, at 26, for more discussion of the intersection of 
NEPA and the phases of OCSLA.
157. See Clean Air Act Section 328, 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a) (2012).  Specifically, Clean Air 
Act Section 328 requires that the EPA:
establish requirements to control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf 
sources located offshore of the States along the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic 
Coasts (other than Outer Continental Shelf sources located offshore of the 
North Slope Borough of the State of Alaska) and along the United States Gulf 
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explained below, neither statute (NEPA or the Clean Air Act) has sufficient 
teeth to independently enforce Executive Order 12898 on the OCS.  How-
ever, administrative review of Clean Air Act permits began to look like a more 
promising option in 2010 with the Environmental Appeals Board’s Shell deci-
sion, before Congress and President Obama removed that option for Alaska’s 
North Slope in 2011.158
a. Judicial Review of Executive Order 12898 in NEPA
The fatal flaw of Executive Order 12898 is that it expressly does not 
“create any right to judicial review involving compliance or noncompliance of 
the United States.”159  As a result of this limiting language, some courts have 
declined to review claims alleging violation of Executive Order 12898.160  How-
ever, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia have “permitted challenges to environmental-justice anal-
yses under NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act”161 and have required 
that agencies’ analyses be something more than a “bare bones conclusion.”162
Nonetheless, the bar is still extremely low for environmental justice anal-
yses in NEPA reviews.  Despite the fact that the EPA issued guidance in 1998 
and 1999 explaining how the EPA should consider environmental justice in its 
own NEPA reviews and in its reviews of other agencies’ environmental impact 
Coast off the State of Florida eastward of longitude 87 degrees and 30 min-
utes . . . to attain and maintain Federal and State ambient air quality standards 
and to comply with the provisions of [the Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion program].
Id.
158. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–74, § 432, 125 Stat. 
1049 (adopted Dec. 23, 2011) (amending Section 328 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7627).
159. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 6–609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
160. See Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443, 449 (1st Cir. 2000) (declin-
ing to review a claim that the EPA’s decision to grant a permit violated Executive Order 
12,898, because the Order does not “create any right to judicial review”); see also Protect our 
Communities Found. v. Salazar, No. 12CV2211-GPC PCL, 2013 WL 5947137, at *15 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 6, 2013) (explaining that “[i]t does not appear the Ninth Circuit allows a cause of action 
under Executive Order 12,898 even if brought under the APA”) (citation omitted)), aff’d sub 
nom. Backcountry Against Dumps v. Jewell, 674 F. App’x 657 (9th Cir. 2017).
161. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 
136 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 
678, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that an environmental justice claim was “properly before 
this court because it arises under NEPA and the APA, rather than [Executive Order 12898],” 
and, because the agency “exercised its discretion to include the environmental justice anal-
ysis in its NEPA evaluation . . . that analysis therefore is properly subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review under the APA.”).
162. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 138–40 (holding that it was arbitrary 
and capricious for the Army Corp to use a 0.5-mile buffer for its environmental justice in an 
EA on a crude oil pipeline, where the “EA does not identify any project involving a crude-oil 
pipeline for which a 0.5-mile buffer was employed” and the plaintiffs pointed to cases that 
had used a larger buffer).
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statements pursuant to Clean Air Act Section 309,163 few environmental jus-
tice-based NEPA claims have been successful in court.164  This lack of success 
by environmental justice advocates under NEPA is not surprising, given that 
environmental plaintiffs raising NEPA claims on any issue succeed only about 
one-third of the time.165  Further, if an agency chooses not to consider environ-
mental justice at all, and public comments do not raise the issue, the agency’s 
choice is “not subject to the [c]ourt’s review under the APA.”166  Therefore, reli-
ance on NEPA to address environmental justice impacts in OCS development 
is unlikely to yield satisfactory results.
163. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental 
Justice Concerns in EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analyses (1998); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Final Guidance for Consideration of Environmental Justice in Clean Air Act 
309 Review (1999).  Clean Air Act Section 309 requires the EPA to “review and comment 
in writing on the environmental impact of any matter relating to duties and responsibili-
ties of the [EPA] Administrator contained in any (1) legislation proposed by any Federal 
department or agency, (2) newly authorized Federal projects for construction and any major 
Federal action [subject to NEPA] and (3) proposed regulations published by any department 
or agency of the Federal Government.”  42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
164. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1368 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (holding that FERC’s discussion of environmental justice in an EIS was not arbi-
trary and capricious); Protect our Communities Found. v. Salazar, No. 12CV2211-GPC PCL, 
2013 WL 5947137, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Backcountry Against Dumps 
v. Jewell, 674 F. App’x 657 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding DOI and BLM’s approval of a utility 
scale wind development, concluding that “even if judicial review of Executive Order 12898 
were available under NEPA and the APA, the Court finds that the BLM reasonably con-
cluded that the minority population and low income populations would not be dispropor-
tionately affected by the Project,” and that “BLM’s decision to limit its analysis to one-half 
mile of the Project was reasonable and is entitled to deference”); Allen v. Nat’l Institutes 
of Health, 974 F. Supp. 2d 18, 47 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding the environmental justice assess-
ment in a NEPA review was sufficient, where it considered the potential impact the BioLab 
may have on low-income and minority populations); Coal for Healthy Ports v. United States 
Coast Guard, No. 13-CV-5347 (RA), 2015 WL 7460018, at *25–26 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015) 
(holding the Coast Guard’s environmental justice analysis in an EA was sufficient where it 
followed 5 steps of: “1) identifying the Project’s study area; 2) identifying low-income and 
minority populations within the study area; 3) identifying the Project’s potential adverse 
impacts on these populations; 4) determining whether any such impacts would dispropor-
tionately burden these populations; and 5) identifying measures to avoid or reduce any dis-
proportionate adverse impacts.”).
165. David E Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in 
Environmental Litigation, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 3, 27 (2018) (noting that environmental plaintiffs 
win 35 percent of NEPA cases at the federal district court level and 27 percent on appeal).
166. City of Dallas, Tex. v. Hall, No. CIVA 307-CV-0060-P, 2007 WL 3125311, at *12 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2007), aff’d, 562 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that Coliseum Square 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 232 (5th Cir. 2006), and Communities Against Runway 
Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2004), “stand for the principle that when 
an agency considers an environmental justice study as a part of its NEPA analysis and con-
sequently, submits that study as part of the administrative record, that study is subject to 
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA,” but judicial review is not required if envi-
ronmental justice is absent from the NEPA process and administrative record).
132 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
Moreover, NEPA may be a limited tool to address any environmental 
issue in OCS development because, as some scholars have observed, “short of 
catastrophe, public outcry, or lack of industry interest, the lease sale process in 
the 5-year plan is on cruise control almost from the outset.”167  Scholars also 
observe that the combination of the truncated timeframe of OCSLA’s five-year 
leasing plan, OCSLA’s requirement that BOEM approve or deny exploration 
plans within thirty days of submission, and BOEM’s practice of granting “con-
ditional approvals” of exploration plans before approval of required safety 
plans results in BOEM either rushing its NEPA analysis or using categorical 
exclusions to avoid a full NEPA analysis.168  This “make[s] it difficult or impos-
sible for agency staff to change or cancel some or all of the proposed oil and 
gas operations.”169
b. Administrative Review of Executive Order 12898 in Clean Air Act 
Permits
In comparison to the largely skeptical approach that courts have taken in 
reviewing environmental justice claims under NEPA,170 administrative review of 
environmental justice claims in EPA permitting—including Clean Air Act per-
mitting for major stationary sources of air pollution—has followed a slightly 
more positive trajectory.  After President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 
in 1994, the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB)—which reviews initial 
permitting decisions of the EPA regional offices—recognized through a series of 
cases over fifteen years that the EPA had the authority to condition permits on 
environmental justice grounds, even in the absence of formal rules or guidance 
documents;171 moreover, the Agency was in fact “encouraged” or even required 
in certain circumstances to consider environmental justice concerns.172
167. Kalen, supra note 45, at 176.
168. See id. at 175–77 (discussing the truncated timing of OCS leasing and environmen-
tal reviews); see also Hartsig, supra note 156, at 26–28.
169. See Hartsig, supra note 156, at 28.
170. See supra, Subpart II.C.3.a.
171. EcoElectrica, 7 E.A.D. 54, 1997 WL 160751, at *9 n.15 (EAB 1997) (recognizing 
that, even in the absence of “formal rules or detailed written guidance on environmental jus-
tice with respect to PSD permitting,” the EPA is permitted to address environmental justice 
issues).
172. See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 143, at 656–77 for an excellent review of EAB per-
mitting decisions considering environmental justice between 1993 and 1999.  As Lazarus and 
Tai explain:
A clear pattern emerges from the past ten years of Appeals Board rulings.  The 
Board is no longer reflexively skeptical of the merits of environmental justice 
claims and has begun to consider the claims more carefully.  Now, when the 
Board rejects environmental justice claims, it centers its rejections less on def-
erence to regional office discretion and more on factual challenges within the 
scope of the environmental justice determinations already made by the regional 
office permitting authorities.
Id. at 676–77.
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Further, the EAB’s evolution with respect to environmental justice was 
bolstered by the 1999 conclusion of the EPA’s Office of General Counsel that 
the agency could consider environmental justice in all permitting decisions.173 
The EPA also issued a series of plans and guidance documents throughout 
the 2000s regarding the consideration of environmental justice in regula-
tory actions, regulatory analyses, and other agency programs and decisions.174 
The EAB subsequently reinforced EPA’s environmental justice policies, now 
requiring that, when the EPA issues permits such as new source air permits and 
OCS air permits, the permit issuer must examine any “superficially plausible” 
claim that the project will disproportionately impact a minority or low-income 
population.175
Notwithstanding the EPA’s and EAB’s positive evolution on consider-
ing environmental justice, the EAB has also made clear that Executive Order 
12898 “impart[s] considerable leeway to federal agencies in determining how 
to comply with the spirit and letter of the Executive Order.”176  Moreover, as 
with NEPA, Executive Order 12898 is merely procedural and “does not man-
date that the Agency reach a determinative outcome when it conducts an 
environmental justice analysis, especially when the available valid data is not 
sufficient to support a determinative outcome.”177  As the EAB explained in 
Avenal Power Center:
173. See EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities Under Which Environmental 
Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting, supra note 151, at 10–14 (describing the 
provisions of the Clean Air Act that allow the EPA to impose permitting requirements based 
on environmental justice concerns).  In addition, the EPA had in 1998 and 1999 issued guid-
ance regarding consideration of environmental justice in NEPA reviews.  See supra note 162.
174. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Plan EJ 2014 (Sept. 2011), https://nepis.epa.gov/
Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100DFCQ.PDF?Dockey=P100DFCQ.PDF [https://perma.cc/WDC8-
YFZN]; EPA Activities to Promote Environmental Justice in the Permit Application Process, 
78 Fed. Reg. 27,220 (May 9, 2013) (proving a “notice of availability of regional actions to 
promote public participation in the permitting process and promising practices for permit 
applicants seeking EPA-issued permits,” including permits issued pursuant to the Clean 
Air Act); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice 
During the Development of Regulatory Actions (May 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-06/documents/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XG58-BB9R]; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Guidance for Assessing 
Environmental Justice in Regulatory Analysis (June 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-06/documents/ejtg_5_6_16_v5.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4UW-W242]; 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EJ 2020 Action Agenda (Oct. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2016-05/documents/052216_ej_2020_strategic_plan_final_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4CN5-NVES]; see generally Environmental Justice, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice [https://perma.cc/JDT9-QZXV].
175. Avenal Power Center, LLC, 15 E.A.D. 384, 2011 WL 4881823, at *11 (EAB 2011) 
(citing Eco Eléctrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56, 69 n.17 (EAB 1997)).
176. Avenal Power Center, LLC, 15 E.A.D. 384, 2011 WL 4881823, at *13, (EAB. 2011); 
see also Pio Pico Energy Center, 16 E.A.D. 56, 2013 WL 4038622 at *67 (EAB 2013).
177. Avenal Power Center, LLC, 15 E.A.D. 384, 2011 WL 4881823 at *14 (EAB 2011).
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[Where] the Agency conducts a substantive environmental justice analysis 
that endeavors to include and analyze data that is germane to the envi-
ronmental justice issue raised during the comment period  .  .  .  and the 
permit issuer demonstrates that it exercised its considered judgment when 
determining that it could not reach a determinative conclusion due to the 
insufficiency of available valid data, the Board will decline to grant review 
of the environmental justice analysis.178
Therefore, just as environmental plaintiffs have had minimal success 
using Executive Order 12898 in courts, their success in front of the EAB has 
also been limited.  Only in rare circumstances has the EAB remanded a permit 
on environmental justice grounds—generally when the EPA provided little to 
no explanation.179  Notably, as the next Part explores, one of those rare remands 
pertained to Shell’s air permit on the Arctic OCS.180  Further, as this Comment 
has already noted, the 2010 Shell ruling could have provided some hope and 
precedent for future challenges to oil and gas drilling in the Arctic OCS.181
D. Shell—A Turning Point?
1. A Temporary Win for Environmental Justice in 2010—
One Paragraph is Not Enough
In 2010, the Native Village of Point Hope and other environmental jus-
tice plaintiffs challenged EPA Region 10’s issuance of two Clean Air Act PSD 
permits required for Shell’s offshore drillships in the Chukchi and Beaufort 
Seas off the North Slope of Alaska.182  Both permits accounted not only for the 
178. Id. at *14 (upholding the EPA’s environmental justice review for a PSD permit for 
a gas-fired power plant, even though the Region did not conclude whether or not the short-
term NO2 emissions would have a disproportionate impact on the surrounding populations, 
but the Region did provide “a thirty-one page environmental justice analysis coupled with a 
reasoned explanation for why it concluded that the limited information available prevented 
it from making a determination regarding potential disproportionate impacts caused by 
short-term NO2 emissions”).
179. See, e.g., Knauf Glass, 8 E.A.D. 121, 1999 WL 64235 at *37–38 (EAB 1999) 
(remanding a fiberglass manufacturing plant’s PSD permit issued by the California Air 
Quality Management District, where “EPA Region IX took the initial responsibility for 
making an environmental justice determination” and determined that “it was unlikely that 
an Environmental Justice issue applied” but provided “no details . . . in the administrative 
record,” giving the EAB nothing on which it could “judge the adequacy of the Region’s 
analysis”); Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *28 (EAB 2010) 
(remanding an OCS PSD permit off the coast of Alaska, where the administrative record 
only contained a cursory, one-paragraph environmental justice review which was based on 
compliance with NAAQS standards that had since been deemed by the EPA to be inade-
quate to protect public health).
180. Shell, 2010 WL 5478647 at *32.
181. See supra Part I.E.
182. Shell, 2010 WL 5478647 at *3 n.3.  For discussion of Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) permits in general, see supra Subpart II.C.2.  For discussion of air reg-
ulation on the Outer Continental Shelf, see infra Part III.B–D.
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main drillship, but also for the use of an associated fleet of mobile support ves-
sels, such as icebreakers and a supply ship.183  However, both permits imposed 
technology-based emissions limits only on the drillship, not the mobile sup-
port vessels.184  The plaintiffs alleged that EPA Region 10 “failed to provide a 
rational response to concerns [they] raised” and that the Region “neglected to 
conduct an environmental justice analysis, notwithstanding evidence of exist-
ing health disparities between Inupiat Eskimos and other U.S. populations.”185
The EAB disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the Region erred 
per se by “simply equat[ing] NAAQS compliance with an environmental jus-
tice analysis.”186  Instead, the EAB focused on the unusual timing of the permit 
issuance in this case—the Region had finalized Shell’s permit after the EPA 
published a final rule establishing a new one-hour NO2 NAAQS, but before 
the new rule’s effective date.187  The EAB highlighted the fact that the EPA 
Administrator had, in issuing the new one-hour NO2 NAAQS rule, made an 
“unequivocal determination” that the old standard was “not requisite to pro-
tect public health with an adequate margin of safety against adverse respiratory 
effects associated with short-term exposures.”188  Moreover, it was this old, 
insufficient standard on which the Region had solely based its environmental 
justice analysis.189  The EAB held it was insufficient for the Region to have this 
“singular focus on demonstrating compliance with a NAAQS standard that the 
Administrator had deemed no longer protective of public health.”190
The EAB also observed that the Region had abstained from conduct-
ing additional analysis based on the fact that the closest Native Alaskans lived 
more than fifty kilometers away—the “radius of significant impact” used by 
183. Shell, 2010 WL 5478647 at *3.
184. Id. at *1–2.  The plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s refusal to require mobile support 
vessels to use Best Available Control Technologies, but the EAB sided with the Region on 
this claim, and the Ninth Circuit upheld this determination in 2013. REDOIL v. U.S. E.P.A., 
716 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2013).
185. Shell, 2010 WL 5478647, at *28.
186. Id. at *28–30.  The plaintiffs reasoned that if a NAAQS violation were a prereq-
uisite, no PSD permit would ever require an environmental justice analysis, because PSD 
permits are only for areas in compliance with the NAAQS.  The Board acknowledged that 
it has accepted NAAQS compliance in the past as “sufficient to demonstrate that emissions 
from a proposed facility will not have disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects on a minority or low-income population.”  Id.
187. The EPA even issued its proposed rule before the Region issued its draft permits. 
The EPA Administrator published its proposed rule to revise the primary NAAQS for NO2 
on July 15, 2009—five months before the Region proposed a modified draft permit and state-
ment of basis on Jan 8, 2010.  Next, on Feb 9, 2010, EPA Administrator published, in Federal 
Register, the final one-hour NO2 NAAQS.  The Region issued the two final permits on Feb 
17 and Mar 22, 2010.  The final NO2 rule did not become effective until April 12, 2010.  Id. at 
*30.
188. Id. at *32.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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the Region in traditional onshore PSD air permits.191  This omission, the EAB 
noted, was unacceptable because it failed to consider the unique impacts of 
offshore drilling on Native Alaskans who practice traditional subsistence fish-
ing and hunting.  Despite the fact that Shell planned to drill approximately 
twenty-five miles from Alaska’s seaward boundary in one location and more 
than twenty-five miles from Alaska’s seaward boundary in another location,192 
the EAB noted that Shell’s drilling could harm Native Alaskans whose fishing 
takes them far from their local villages and places them for “extended periods 
of time closer to the emissions sources than suggested” by the Region.193
Finally, the EAB emphasized the paltry length of the Region’s environ-
mental justice analysis:
Of the scant one-and-one-half pages the Region devotes to environmental 
justice in the Chukchi Response to Comments, a single paragraph .  .  . rep-
resents the Region’s entire substantive analysis of environmental justice.  The 
remaining paragraphs devoted to environmental justice briefly summarize the 
comments received and the Executive Order, and discuss the Region’s efforts 
to satisfy its regulatory obligations with respect to public participation. 194
Therefore, the EAB remanded the two permits to the regional EPA office 
“to reconsider the adequacy of its environmental justice analysis.”195
2. Twenty Pages of EJ Analysis is Sufficient in 2012
It was a shortlived win for the Native Village of Point Hope and its 
coplaintiffs.  After the EAB remanded Shell’s Clean Air Act permit in 2010, 
the Region “released a twenty-page supplemental environmental justice analy-
sis to accompany the Permits.”196  This analysis examined the impacts of Shell’s 
stationary and mobile activities on Native Alaskans’ onshore and offshore activ-
ities, including “traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, and whaling.”197 
The EAB subsequently upheld this revised analysis in 2012, holding that:
The Region conducted a supplemental environmental justice analysis that 
included and analyzed data that is germane to the environmental justice 
issue raised during the comment period, and the Region has demon-
strated that it exercised its considered judgment when it juxtaposed the 
191. Id. at *31 n.80.
192. Id. at *7.
193. Id. at *31 n.80.
194. Id. at *33 n.83.
195. Id. at *32.
196. Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *18 (EAB 2012).
197. Id.  The Board clarified that the EPA’s regulations did not require the Region to 
analyze the impacts of mobile source emissions.  Id. at *20.  Under Section 328 of the Clean 
Air Act, mobile emissions supporting a drillship on the OCS count toward the determination 
of whether an OCS source exceeds the trigger of PSD permitting requirements.  However, 
the EPA has interpreted Section 328 not to require mobile support vessels to actually imple-
ment technology-based reductions required of the main OCS source—the drillship or rig. 
Thus, the EAB determined that because mobile support vessels need not reduce emissions, 
their environmental justice impacts need not be analyzed.  Id.
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subsistence use areas and the planned exploration areas and discussed the 
distances between the North Slope villages and the closest lease blocks and 
well sites, respectively.198
Specifically, the Region’s analysis examined the distances between Shell’s 
lease blocks and planned drill sites to the closest onshore communities, as 
well as to offshore subsistence use areas.199  It also analyzed “demographic, 
health-related, and air quality data.”200  The Region also assessed compliance 
with the new one-hour NO2 NAAQS, a new one-hour SO2 NAAQS, and all 
other NAAQS.  The Region concluded the NAAQS would be attained in “all 
areas accessible to the public, including areas both onshore and offshore where 
local communities engage in subsistence activities” and, therefore, “Shell’s 
proposed OCS activities in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas will not result in 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects 
with respect to Alaska Natives residing on the North Slope.”201
Shortly after the EAB’s decision, Shell obtained the rest of the permits it 
needed to begin drilling, and it began drilling in the summer of 2012.  As explained 
above in Part II.C, Shell’s summer of drilling was “disastrous” and included run-
ning one of its drill ships aground and racking up $1.1 million in fines for violating 
its air permits—specifically, the NOx standard that had been the primary point 
of contention in Shell (2010).202  Shell’s disastrous venture in the Arctic OCS 
highlights the inadequacy of administrative avenues to completely address envi-
ronmental justice harms.  Nonetheless, the EAB’s 2010 decision, in setting at least 
some floor for environmental justice analyses in OCS air permitting decisions, 
was a positive step from past precedent and one that could have been a gate-
way for environmental justice advocates to push for more.  However, as the Part 
III will explain, Congress and President Obama removed the EPA’s authority to 
require air permits in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, and replaced it with a regu-
latory regime under the Department of the Interior and OCSLA—a solution that 
is inferior for mitigating harms to Native Alaskans.  Moreover, President Trump’s 
198. Id.
199. Id. at 18 (“The analysis catalogues the distances between the Iñupiat communities 
on the coast of the North Slope and Shell’s lease blocks closest to shore in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas and also includes relative distances between the specific planned drill sites in 
the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas .  .  . and the distances to the closest onshore communities. 
The Region also included an illustration that juxtaposes the location of Shell’s lease blocks, 
including planned drill sites  .  .  .  with onshore and offshore subsistence use areas for the 
northern Iñupiat communities.”).
200. Id.  For example, “68% of residents living in the North Slope Borough classify 
themselves as Alaska Natives” and “nearly half of North Slope residents speak a language 
other than English at home.”  Id.  Between 1997 and 2007, “there was a 158% increase in the 
prevalence of diabetes for Alaska Natives residing in the North Slope Borough,” whereas 
there was only a 117 percent increase for Alaska Natives statewide during the same time 
period.  Id.
201. Id. at *18–19.
202. See Foster, supra note 76; see also Smith, supra note 62.
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administration has been rolling back environmental justice funding and policies 
in both the EPA and Department of Interior, a move that puts Native Alaskans 
at risk regardless of which agency oversees Arctic OCS development.
III. Regulating Air Quality on the Outer Continental Shelf— 
An Erratic History of Political Whims
A. OCSLA Overview: Balancing Energy Development and Environmental 
Protection
As noted above in Part II.A., OCSLA first established the jurisdiction 
and framework for regulating offshore oil and gas development on the OCS.203 
OCSLA incorporates competing policy goals of—first and foremost—making 
offshore oil and gas resources “available to meet the Nation’s energy needs 
as rapidly as possible,”204 while also obtaining “a proper balance between the 
potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and 
gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”205  OCSLA estab-
lishes four stages of offshore oil and gas development: (1) BOEM develops a 
five-year leasing program for the entire OCS; (2) BOEM holds lease sales for 
individual areas scheduled in the five-year plan; (3) lessees apply to “explore”; 
and (4) lessees submit an Application to Drill and a Development and Produc-
tion Plan (DPP).206  Section 18 of OCSLA requires the five-year leasing program 
to “best meet the national energy needs”207 in a “manner which considers eco-
nomic, social, and environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable 
resources contained in the outer Continental Shelf, and the potential impact of 
oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the outer Continental Shelf 
and the marine, coastal, and human environments.”208  OCSLA also requires 
“consideration” of eight specific factors in determining when, where, and how to 
allow development of the OCS.209  Further, selection of the “timing and location 
203. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (2012).
204. Id. § 1802(2)(A).  The D.C. Circuit held that, “while the Department must consider 
each of the statutory factors required when making leasing decisions, including environmen-
tal considerations, these factors need not be equally weighed and ‘the Act has an objective—
the expeditious development of OCS resources.’”  See Kalen, supra note 45, at 164 (citing 
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
205. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2012).
206. See Levine et al., supra note 53, at 235–36 (citing 43 U.S.C. §  1344(a); 1337(b)
(4), 1340(c)(1), 1351(a)(1)); see also Kalen, supra note 45, at 162–63.  OCSLA charges the 
Secretary of the Interior with the Act’s implementation.  The Secretary then delegated 
OCSLA responsibility to the Minerals Management Service in Secretarial Order 3071 (Jan. 
19, 1982), and later redelegated OCSLA authority to BOEM after its establishment in 2010. 
Cong. Research. Serv., R45480, U.S. Department of the Interior: An Overview 9 (2019).
207. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
208. Id. § 1344(a)(1).
209. Id. § 1344(a)(2).  These factors include:
(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological 
characteristics of such regions; (B) an equitable sharing of developmental bene-
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of leasing, [shall] to the maximum extent practicable . . . obtain a proper balance 
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery 
of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”210
Although OCSLA has long governed oil and gas development on the 
OCS in general, OCSLA has not always governed air emissions on the OCS. 
The Parts that follow will detail how regulatory authority over air emissions on 
the OCS has changed hands several times over the last half-century.211  Figure 
2 also provides a summary of major regulatory changes and influential events.
Figure 2: Timeline of Key Events and Laws Influencing Development of the Arctic 
OCS212
fits and environmental risks among the various regions; (C) the location of such 
regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and national energy 
markets; (D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and 
seabed, including fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential 
sites of deepwater ports, and other anticipated uses of the resources and space of 
the outer Continental Shelf; (E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in 
the development of oil and gas resources as indicated by exploration or nomina-
tion; (F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifically 
identified by the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary’s 
consideration; (G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity 
of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf; and (H) relevant environmental 
and predictive information for different areas of the outer Continental Shelf.
Id.
210. Id. § 1344(a)(3).
211. Air emissions permitting on the OCS is currently shared by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), acting through 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), with each having jurisdiction in differ-
ent locations and each imposing requirements that vary depending on how far away from 
shore an operation is located.  For an overview of the history of air regulation on the Outer 
Continental Shelf, see Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, 
supra note 34, at 5–7; see also Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, Proposed 
Rule, 81 Fed. Reg 19718, 19722 (Apr. 5, 2016).
212. Figure created by author.
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B. Regulating OCS Air Emissions Under OCSLA, 1953–1990
Congress enacted OCSLA in 1953, seventeen years before it enacted the 
Clean Air Act’s contemporary air quality regulatory regime.  The 1953 ver-
sion of OCSLA213 did not specifically mention air emissions, but rather charged 
the Secretary of the Interior with the authority to establish “rules and regula-
tions as he determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the 
prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer 
Continental Shelf.”214  At that time, however, “conservation” referred not to the 
modern conception of ecological protection, but instead “referred to the desire 
not to waste the resource physically by destroying the oil and gas reservoir.”215
Two years after OCSLA’s enactment, Congress signaled its initial inkling 
of concern over the nation’s air quality when it passed “the first federal legisla-
tion involving air pollution”—the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955; however, 
this Act was limited to funding air pollution research.216  Congress next adopted 
the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Air Quality Act of 1967, but both laws again 
largely focused on air quality monitoring and research.217  It wasn’t until 1970 
when, concerned about the “dense, visible smog in many of the nation’s cities 
and industrial centers,” Congress adopted a major overhaul of the Clean Air 
Act, enacting what is still the basic structure of current law.218  The 1970 Clean 
Air Act established the requirements for the EPA to adopt NAAQS for air 
pollutants that are harmful to human health and welfare, as well as regulate 
emissions from major stationary sources and mobile sources, as described in 
Part II.  However, Congress did not specify in either the 1970 Act or in the 1977 
amendments, which established the PSD program,219  whether the Clean Air 
Act applied to activities on the OCS.
Congress resolved that ambiguity in 1978, when it amended OCSLA to 
address air quality emissions on the OCS.220  These amendments required the 
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations “for compliance with the 
national ambient air quality standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act . . . to the 
213. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (2012)).
214. 43 U.S.C. § 1334; see also Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from 
the OCS, supra note 34, at 5 n.17.
215.  Deep Water, supra note 64, at 58.
216. Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/GNQ7-KQTJ].
217. See id.
218. Clean Air Act Requirements and History, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, https://
www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history [https://perma.
cc/F6ET-KPHM].
219. Evolution of the Clean Air Act, supra note 216.  For additional discussion of the 
PSD program, see supra Subpart II.C.2.
220. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–372, 92 
Stat. 629, 638 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012)).
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extent that activities . . . significantly affect the air quality of any State.”221  The 
legislative history of these amendments shows that concern over environmen-
tal degradation from OCS sources had been building throughout the 1970s, 
catalyzed by the 1969 blowout from offshore drilling near Santa Barbara, Cal-
ifornia, which resulted in the “largest oil spill in U.S. history” and caused $1.06 
billion (in 1969 dollars) of damage.222  State and local governments were con-
cerned “their beaches, estuaries, and shoreline areas  .  .  .  could be severely 
damage by an OCS-related spill.”223  In addition, the House of Representatives 
was concerned with “the quality of air above the leasing areas of the Shelf and 
on the quality of air above adjacent on-shore coastal areas,” and therefore pro-
posed a bill in August 1977 addressing both.224
Nevertheless, at the same time as the environmental movement was grow-
ing, OCSLA’s legislative history shows that “the shortfall of domestic energy 
production and the Arab oil embargo of 1973 had an equally dramatic impact” 
on the policies of President Nixon and Congress.225  “President Nixon called 
for stepping up the OCS lease sale schedule while, at the same time, environ-
mental and citizen organizations, commercial and recreational fishing interests, 
and other groups, expressed public concern over the possible effects of the 
proposed rapid development.”226  Therefore, the Senate’s proposed OCSLA 
amendments focused on accelerating OCS development and omitted any lan-
guage pertaining to air quality.227
In April 1978, however, the EPA essentially forced Congress’s hand by 
publishing a “notice of determination that the Clean Air Act . . . appl[ies] to 
activities on the Outer Continental Shelf when such activities could affect the 
air quality of an adjacent state.”228  The House and the Senate ultimately com-
promised by adopting a bill that required the Secretary of the Interior, rather 
than the Administrator of the EPA, to regulate air emissions from OCS sources, 
but only as necessary to comply with onshore NAAQS.229  Congress’s report 
on the 1978 amendments expressly clarified that it had chosen not to “require 
that the air mass above the OCS itself be brought into compliance” with the 
NAAQS.230  President Carter signed the amendments into law in Septem-
221. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(8) (2012).
222. H.R. Rep. No. 95–590, at 75–87 (1977).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 89.
226. Id.
227. S. Rep. No. 95–284 (June 21, 1977) (omitting any reference to air quality or the 
Clean Air Act).
228. S. Rep. No. 95–1091, at 86 (1978).
229. See 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(8) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to pro-
mulgate regulations for “compliance with the national ambient air quality standards pursu-
ant to the Clean Air Act . . . to the extent that activities . . . significantly affect the air quality 
of any State.”).
230. S. Rep. No. 95–1091, at 85–86 (1978).
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ber 1978.231  The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) at the time, first promulgated OCSLA air quality regulations 
in 1980.232  These regulations have remained largely unchanged since then.
C. Regulating OCS Air under the Clean Air Act, 1990–2011
In 1990, Congress amended OCS air regulation again when it added Sec-
tion 328 to the Clean Air Act, transferring authority from the Department of 
the Interior to the EPA to regulate air emissions in most of the OCS, with the 
exception of the central and western Gulf of Mexico, which remained fully 
under the Interior’s authority.233  The legislative history shows that Congress 
adopted Section 328 after becoming concerned that “construction and opera-
tion of OCS facilities emit a significant amount of air pollution which adversely 
impacts coastal air quality” and that OCS air pollution was “causing or con-
tributing to the violation of Federal and State ambient air quality standards 
in coastal regions.”234  A Senate report noted that “OCS pollution in the Santa 
Barbara Channel and Santa Maria Basin for example, is expected to be equiv-
alent to 37 percent of Santa Barbara County’s onshore NOx inventory and 22 
percent of its onshore reactive hydrocarbon inventory in the year 2000.”235  The 
report also noted that “[e]normous discrepancies exist in the regulation of air 
pollution from virtually identical onshore and OCS sources.”236  It rationalized 
that attempting to meet “national energy production goals” while maintaining 
national air quality standards would require “the permitting and regulation of 
many low-polluting facilities,” and continuing to allow loosely regulated, highly 
polluting offshore facilities would impede this strategy.237  One inconsistency in 
the legislative history, however, is that the Senate and the EPA expressed “con-
cern about the onshore air quality impacts from OCS develo[p]ment, along the 
coasts of both California and the Gulf States,”238 but the version of Section 328 
that Congress ultimately adopted omitted the central and western Gulf from 
its requirements.239
231. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–372, 92 
Stat. 629 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012)) (signed by President Carter on 
Sept. 18, 1978).
232. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 45 Fed. Reg. 
15,128 (Mar. 7, 1980) (currently codified at 30 C.F.R. § 550, Subparts A, B, and C (2019)).
233. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2012)).  Section 328 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7627.  The 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 made many other changes that are outside of the scope 
of this Comment’s focus.
234. S. Rep. No. 101–228, at 76–77 (1989).
235. Id. at 77.
236. Id. at 76.
237. Id. at 77.
238. Id. at 77.
239. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2012)).
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D. 2011 Through Today: OCS Air Regulation Under the CAA and OCSLA
As explained above, under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, air 
emissions from Arctic OCS activities fell under the EPA’s Clean Air Act juris-
diction.  However, in the first decade of this millennium, the political climate 
shifted once again as energy prices and demand began to rise, climate change 
and melting sea ice began to open up new parts of the Arctic,240 the presence 
of the United States in the Middle East increased pressure to boost domes-
tic energy production—including from the Arctic241—and Republicans took 
control of the House midway through President Obama’s first term.242  House 
Republicans undertook “a war on environmental regulations” to such an extent 
that some dubbed them “the most anti-environment Congress ever.”243  Pres-
ident Obama, however, was not blameless in this nationwide push for fossil 
fuel development.244  Ironically, Congress and President Obama alike grew 
concerned by the slowdowns in OCS permit approvals that occurred both in 
the immediate wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico245 and as a result of the EAB’s revocation of Shell’s Clean Air Act 
permit for development in the Arctic OCS based on environmental justice 
concerns.246  In 2011, Congress expressed concern that “delays in issuing [OCS] 
permits and lack of clarity on what is required for a permit have resulted in 
large losses for the businesses that contract and service rigs and unnecessary 
job losses for Americans in a difficult economy.”247  The House Committee on 
Appropriations “strongly encourage[d]” BOEM to issue more offshore 
240. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
241. For example, during a 2011 Congressional hearing in which Representative Don 
Young (R-AK) urged his colleagues to vote for his appropriations bill amendment that 
would remove all reviewing authority of the EPA Environmental Appeals Board over CAA 
permits on the Arctic OCS.  Rep. Young advocated for the government to issue offshore oil 
and gas drilling permits “so we don’t have to go to war over in the Middle East over oil.”  157 
Cong. Rec. H1182 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (statement of Rep. Young).
242. Jeff Zeleny, G.O.P Captures House, but Not Senate, N.Y. Times (Nov. 2, 2010), 
https://nyti.ms/2JgoKQM [https://perma.cc/88T8-ZY5R].
243. Kate Sheppard, The Most Anti-Environment Congress Ever?, The Guardian (Sept. 
13, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/sep/13/anti-environment-con-
gress-ever [https://perma.cc/2DKC-U9NS].
244. See Broder & Krauss, supra note 60 (describing how lobbying by Shell and Senator 
Begich won over President Obama on Arctic OCS drilling, resulting in President Obama’s 
administration shepherding Shell’s Arctic drilling approvals).
245. See Deep Water, supra note 64, at 152 (explaining how, in May 2010, Interior 
Secretary Salazar placed a six-month moratorium on drilling in waters deeper than 500 feet 
in the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean).
246. See Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *32 (EAB 2010).
247. See Committee on Appropriations,  Report on Dep’t of the Interior, Environment, 
and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Report to Accompany HR 2584, H.R. Rep. No. 
112–151, at 39 (2011); see also 157 Cong. Rec. H5464 (daily ed. July 25, 2011) (remarks by 
Rep. Richmond expressing concern over the slow speed of permitting on the OCS and the 
need to increase funding for BOEMRE to “quicken the pace of permit approval.”).
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permits, and supported a bill that “set[] parameters for the approval of explo-
ration permits by the Environmental Protection Agency,” in that it required 
the “air quality impact of any OCS source [to] be . . . determined solely with 
respect to the impacts in the corresponding area” and set a six-month deadline 
for “final agency action on a permit application for platform or drill ship explo-
ration on an OCS source.”248  Notably, however, that proposed bill kept OCS 
air permitting authority with the EPA.249
Those changes didn’t go far enough to satisfy the Alaskan Delegation in 
Congress, however.  Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski vocalized her concern 
on multiple occasions that Shell had spent somewhere between “$2 billion” 
and “tens of millions of dollars trying to thread the needle through the EPA’s 
regulatory morass” without receiving the necessary permits for drilling on the 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.250  Murkowski complained:
[T]he delay truly is—it’s 100 percent attributable to the EPA . . . I cannot 
understand I just cannot understand how it can take so long for an agency 
to approve an air permit for a drilling rig that will operate 25 to 75 miles 
offshore less than one quarter of the year.251
Consistent with Senator Murkowski’s frustration, Representative Don 
Young (R-AK) introduced an amendment to an appropriations bill in 2011 that 
would prohibit the EPA’s EAB from “consider[ing], review[ing], reject[ing], 
remand[ing], or otherwise invalidat[ing] any permit issued for Outer Conti-
nental Shelf source located offshore of the States along the Arctic Coast under 
section 328(a) of the Clean Air Act.”252  In supporting his bill, Representative 
Young disdainfully referred multiple times to the “lawyers” on the EAB, and 
called the EAB “bureaucrats who don’t want to issue the permits.”253  “What 
this amendment will do,” said Representative Young, “is remove the ability for 
lawyers to overrule EPA permit writers.”254  The House passed Representative 
248. Committee on Appropriations,  Report on Dep’t of the Interior, Environment, 
and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Report to Accompany HR 2584, H.R. Rep. No. 
112–151, at 39, 137–38, 157 (2011); see also H.R. 2584, 112th Cong. § 443 (as introduced on 
Jul. 19, 2011).
249. H.R. Rep. No. 112–151, at 137 (2011).
250. Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 
Fiscal Year 2012: Hearings on H.R. 2584 Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 
112–392, at 4–5 (2011).  In addition, Representative Don Young’s (R-AK) tales of Shell were 
even taller, claiming Shell had invested “[o]ver $4 billion .  .  .  in trying to drill exploratory 
wells, and to date not a single well has been drilled because of one EPA air permit,” and that 
Shell’s leases were “80 miles from any human, other than those who work on these ships.” 
157 Cong. Rec. H1182 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (statement of Rep. Young).
251. Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations: 
Hearing on H.R. 2584 Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 112–392, at 74 
(2011) (statement of Senator Lisa Murkowski).
252. See 157 Cong. Rec. 2464 (2011).
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Young’s provision in February 2011 with a vote mostly along party lines,255 but 
it was not ultimately adopted in the Senate.  How the two houses struck their 
final compromise, which exempted the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas from the 
Clean Air Act’s Section 328 permitting requirements, is nowhere to be found 
in the legislative history.256  However, Mark Begich, a freshman senator from 
Alaska, was a “crucial Democratic vote in a narrowly divided Senate repre-
senting a decidedly Republican state” and had been unrelenting in lobbying 
President Obama to push for more Arctic oil and gas development.257  Ulti-
mately, President Obama signed the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act on 
December 23, 2011, transferring air emissions permitting authority for activ-
ities in Alaska’s North Slope OCS from the EPA back to the Department of 
the Interior.258
Since these 2011 changes, BOEM has had authority pursuant to OCSLA 
to regulate air emissions from OCS sources located in the Gulf of Mexico 
west of 87.5° longitude (offshore Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) 
and areas offshore the North Slope of Alaska, including the Chukchi Sea and 
Beaufort Sea, while the EPA has had authority under Clean Air Act Section 
328 to regulate air emissions in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Mexico off 
the coast of Florida, as well as all other remaining OCS areas (see Figure 3).259 
The result is a seriously disjointed regime of regulations over air emissions 
on the OCS—one that has the potential to create confusion and uncertainty 
for all stakeholders, but also that results in requirements for drilling activities 
in the Arctic OCS that differ in important and potentially harmful ways for 
Native Alaskans, as explained in the next Part.
255. The vote was 243–185. 230 Republicans voted yes, 9 Republicans voted no; 13 
Democrats voted yes, 176 Democrats voted no.  Final Vote Results for Roll Call 94, Office of 
the Clerk: U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 18, 2011, 2:17 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll094.xml [https://perma.cc/9QW5-MGT5].
256. I looked through every bill and resolution feeding into the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–74, § 432, 125 Stat. 786, 1049 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2012) (amending Section 328 of the Clean Air Act)).  The CAA exemp-
tion for the North Slope is nowhere to be found until December 2011 in H.R. 3671, 112th 
Cong. (2012), which was sponsored by Representative Harold Rogers (R-KY), just days 
before this exemption was incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012.
257. Broder & Krauss, supra note 60.
258. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–74, § 432, 125 Stat. 786, 
1049 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2012) (amending Section 328 of the Clean Air 
Act).
259. See Brian Cameron, Jr. & Teshara Matthews, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 
Bureau of Ocean Mgmt., Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, OCS Regulatory Framework 
11–12 (2016), https://www.boem.gov/OCS-Regulatory-Framework [https://perma.cc/6CXK-
TMYE]; Outer Continental Shelf Air Permits, Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
caa-permitting/outer-continental-shelf-air-permits [https://perma.cc/C4YZ-8NDX].
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Figure 3: EPA’s and DOI’s Jurisdiction over Air Regulations on the OCS260
E. Comparing BOEM and EPA OCS Air Regulations and Implications for 
Native Alaskans
While BOEM and the EPA both regulate oil and gas activities on the 
OCS with the overall objective of controlling harmful air pollutants, BOEM’s 
regulations are generally “not as stringent as EPA’s for sources of similar size 
and type of air pollution”261 and less effectively address impacts on Native 
Alaskans, as this Part will explain.  BOEM’s OCS air regulations have not 
been updated since they were first adopted in 1980, leading some to observe 
that BOEM’s regulations “are outdated and do not reflect the best science or 
technology available today.”262  Further, as BOEM acknowledges, “there are 
differences in each agency’s statutory authority and differences in the way each 
agency implements its statutory charge.”263  Importantly, the primary objectives 
of the two governing statutes—the Clean Air Act and OCSLA—are different. 
In short, it’s “air quality versus offshore energy development,” respectively.264 
260. Underlying map source: Restr:Map of USA AK full.svg, Wikipedia, https://br.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Restr:Map_of_USA_AK_full.svg [https://perma.cc/YH3Q-7RFZ] (labels 
made by author).
261. Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards: Recommendations on Oil Spill 
Prevention, Response, and Safety in the U.S. Arctic Ocean 29-30 (2013), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/09/23/arcticstandardsfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGQ6-
FRLL] [hereinafter Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards].
262. Id. at 90.
263. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19718, 19722 (pro-
posed Apr. 5, 2016).
264. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 
34, at 24.  As courts have noted, “OCSLA’s fundamental objective is the ‘expeditious and 
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The resulting OCS air regulations promulgated by EPA and BOEM differ with 
respect to: (1) the locational focus of the air quality impacts (onshore only, or 
both offshore and onshore); (2) what pollutants are regulated; (3) what quan-
tity of pollutants trigger regulation; (4) how emissions from mobile sources are 
evaluated; (5) the timing of project approvals and public participation periods; 
and, importantly for this Comment, (6) the opportunities for administrative 
appeal and the implications for environmental justice.  A seventh issue not 
specific to the OCS but relevant to this Comment is the differences between 
the EPA and BOEM in their commitment to addressing environmental jus-
tice generally.  Not surprisingly, the EPA’s regulations tend to provide more 
opportunity to protect the interests of Native Alaskan communities, although 
there are some minor exceptions and still much room for improvement, as 
explained below.  Table 1 summarizes these regulatory differences, which this 
Part explores in detail.
Table 1: Key Differences Between EPA’s and BOEM’s OCS Air Regulations
1. Onshore Versus Offshore Air Quality
Section 328 of the Clean Air Act controls air quality above the OCS by 
directing the EPA to “establish requirements to control air pollution from 
Outer Continental Shelf sources . . . to attain and maintain Federal and State 
ambient air quality standards to comply with the provisions” of the Act’s PSD 
orderly’ development of the Outer Continental Shelf’s energy reserves, subject to appropri-
ate environmental safeguards.”  Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, No. 1:08-cv-0004-RRB, 
2010 WL 2943120, at *2 (D. Alaska July 21, 2010) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)), order clarified, 
No. 1:08-CV-0004-RRB, 2010 WL 3025163 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 2010).
148 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
program.265  In addition, Section 328 requires OCS sources located within 
twenty-five miles of a state’s boundary to meet all state and local air emissions 
requirements that would apply if the source were located onshore.266  If federal 
and state or local requirements conflict, EPA regulations provide that the more 
environmentally stringent requirements apply.267
In contrast to the Clean Air Act’s dual focus on offshore and onshore 
air quality, OCSLA requires BOEM to promulgate regulations for compliance 
with the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS only “to the extent that activities authorized 
[under OCSLA] significantly affect the air quality of any State.”268  BOEM’s 
interpretation of this phrase is important in two different ways: (1) what area 
the agency considers to be included in “any state;” and (2) what it deems to 
be “significant.”  First, BOEM has “historically interpreted [this] phrase . . . to 
limit it to considering those effects that would occur landward of the shore-
line” and not effects that would occur in state waters.269  BOEM temporarily 
changed its interpretation in a proposed rule in 2016, concluding that its OCS 
air regulations should consider effects in “the entire area of a State’s jurisdic-
tion extending to its seaward boundary (either three or nine nautical miles 
seaward of its shoreline).”270  In 2017, however, President Trump ordered the 
Secretary of the Interior to revise or withdraw this rule.271  Just three days later, 
then-Secretary Zinke ordered BOEM to “immediately cease all activities to 
promulgate” the proposed rule.272  Even if BOEM had adopted its 2016 pro-
265. 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a) (2012); see also supra Subpart II.C.2 for an overview of Clean 
Air Act provisions relevant to the OCS.  In addition, OCS sources beyond 25 nautical 
miles from the state seaward boundary may also be subject to “Title V operating permit 
program requirements, and are subject to New Source Performance Standards and some 
standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants promulgated under section 112 of the CAA.”  Outer 
Continental Shelf Air Permits, Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/caa-permitting/
outer- continental-shelf-air-permits [https://perma.cc/6L57-HAR6].
266. 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1) (2012) (“[S]uch requirements shall be the same as would be 
applicable if the source were located in the corresponding onshore area, and shall include, 
but not be limited to, State and local requirements for emission controls, emission limita-
tions, offsets, permitting, monitoring, testing, and reporting.”); see also Cong. Research Serv., 
Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, at 13.
267. 40 C.F.R. §§ 55.13–55.14 (2018).
268. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(8) (2012) (emphasis added).
269. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,738–739 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016) (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 19,739.
271. Exec. Order No. 13,795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, 
82 Fed. Reg. 20,815, 20,817 (Apr. 28, 2017) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall take all steps 
necessary to review BOEM’s Proposed Rule entitled ‘Air Quality Control, Reporting, and 
Compliance,’ 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718 (April 5, 2016), along with any related rules and guidance, 
and, if appropriate, shall, as soon as practicable and consistent with law, consider whether the 
proposed rule, and any related rules and guidance, should be revised or withdrawn.”).
272. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3350, America-First Offshore 
Energy Strategy, Secretary of the Interior, § 4(a)(5) (May 1, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/
doi.gov/files/press-release/secretarial-order-3350.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LCB-Y5E6].  In 
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posed changes, however, OCSLA still would not allow BOEM to regulate air 
quality beyond the state’s seaward boundary and “above the OCS generally,”273 
unlike Clean Air Act Section 328.
The second notable characteristic of BOEM’s interpretation of OCSLA’s 
mandate to regulate OCS activities that “significantly affect the air quality 
of any State” is what the agency deems “significant”—in other words, what 
amount of ambient air pollution in the state triggers BOEM’s regulation of 
the OCS source.  Different observers offer potentially conflicting summaries. 
The Congressional Research Service explained that BOEM’s measure of “sig-
nificance” is the same as what the EPA uses for determining if a new major 
source of air pollution would significantly impact a neighboring area that is not 
in attainment with the NAAQS.274  However, Pew Charitable Trust observed 
that, because BOEM’s OCS air regulations have not been updated since 1980, 
the amount of ambient air pollution BOEM considers “significant” enough to 
trigger regulation is the same level that was “used by [the] EPA in 1980” and 
therefore is only about “two percent of the national ambient air quality stan-
dards” used today.275  In simpler terms, compared to the EPA’s air regulations, 
BOEM’s air regulations tolerate a much dirtier level of ambient air pollution 
before its OCS regulations kick-in.
The diverging foci on solely onshore air quality (as in OCSLA’s regula-
tory regime) and both offshore and onshore air quality (as in Clean Air Act 
Section 328) is critical for Native Alaskans who travel up to sixty miles offshore 
during their traditional fishing and whaling expeditions, closer to offshore drill-
ing activities and hence closer to pollution sources.276  The importance of this 
distinction was highlighted in the 2010 EPA EAB case that remanded Shell’s 
Clean Air Act OCS permits in part because of the Region’s failure to ade-
November 2017, the Secretary of the Interior reported that Interior is “currently reviewing” 
BOEM’s 2016 air quality proposed rule and is considering “promulgating final rules for cer-
tain necessary provisions and issuing a new proposed rule that may withdraw certain provi-
sions and seek additional input on others.”  Final Report: Review of the Department of the 
Interior Actions That Potentially Burden Domestic Energy, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,532, 50,540 (Nov. 
1, 2017).  No activity has been posted to the docket of the 2016 air quality proposed rule since 
November 2017. Docket ID: BOEM-2013-0081, RIN 1010-AD82.
273. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,722 (pro-
posed Apr. 5, 2016).
274. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 20.  Specifically, BOEM’s “significance” threshold is the same as that used by the “EPA 
when determining whether a new major source would significantly impact the air quality of a 
neighboring nonattainment area.”  Id.  Further, OCS sources significantly impacting onshore 
areas that are in attainment with NAAQS must apply Best Available Control Technologies 
(BACT), while OCS sources significantly impacting the air quality of nonattainment onshore 
areas must “fully reduce” emissions using BACTs and additional reductions or offsets from 
other sources.  Id. at 21 (citing 40 CFR 52.21(c)).
275. Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards, supra note 261, at 91.
276. See Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *18, n.32 (EAB 
2012).
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quately consider offshore impacts on Native fishers and hunters.277  By contrast, 
consideration of solely onshore impacts can lead to harmful results for Native 
Alaskans.  For example, BOEM’s August 2018 Final Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Liberty Development and Production Plan in the Beaufort 
Sea concluded that the Plan would “not result in any degradation to the human 
health conditions” in the Village of Nuiqsut because Nuiqsut is “over 60 miles 
west of the Proposed Action Area, [and] any emissions produced as a result of 
the Proposed Action would be dispersed and well mixed with the ambient air 
to at or below normal background concentrations before reaching those com-
munities.”278  BOEM’s sole focus on onshore air quality ignores the Nuiqsut 
hunters who travel up to sixty miles offshore for hunting—the precise distance 
from shore of the Liberty Project’s proposed location.279
2. Types of Pollutants Regulated
As previously noted, the EPA currently regulates six “criteria pollutants” 
under the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS provisions: carbon monoxide (CO); nitro-
gen dioxide (NO2); sulfur dioxide (SO2); ozone (O3); fine particulate matter 
(PM2.5) and coarse particulate matter (PM10); and lead (Pb).280  Although 
BOEM regulates most of these criteria pollutants, as well as two ozone precur-
sor pollutants—NOx and VOCs—BOEM’s OCS air quality regulations do not 
require review of lead, fine particulate matter (PM2.5), or ozone.281
With respect to particulate matter, BOEM uses an outdated “total sus-
pended particulate pollution” (TSP) standard that the EPA long ago replaced 
with “more detailed and health-protective” standards that separately address 
fine particulate patter (PM2.5) and coarse particulate matter (PM10).282  This 
distinction is important for the health of Native Alaskans because, as noted 
in Part III.B, smaller particles can lodge deeper into the lungs and the blood-
stream “and cause serious health problems.”283  The TSP standard used by 
BOM is therefore inadequate to address the threats posed by smaller partic-
ulate matter.
277. See Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 2010 WL 5478647, at *1 (EAB 2010); 
Shell Gulf of Mex., Inc., 15 E.A.D. 470, 2012 WL 119962, at *1, (EAB 2012).
278. BOEM, Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS, supra note 119, at 
4–39, 4–42.
279. BOEM’s conclusion also ignores the fact that the prevailing winds in the sum-
mer—the season when drilling occurs—come from the northeast.  Id. at 4–39.  These winds 
could blow offshore air pollutants southwest right into the Village of Nuiqsut.
280. See Criteria Air Pollutants, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/crite-
ria-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/A874-9JL5].
281. See Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,723–
725 (proposed Apr. 5, 2016).
282. Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards, supra note 261, at 91.
283. Particulate Matter (PM) Pollution, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics#PM [https://perma.cc/B5JT-VAWG].
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BOEM’s omission of lead from its regulations is also concerning because 
lead can have lasting impacts on human health, including disruption of the 
“nervous system, kidney function, immune system, reproductive and develop-
ment systems and the cardiovascular system” in people of all ages, as well as 
brain development and IQ in children.284  Thus, BOEM should include lead in 
an update to its OCS air regulations, if the agency remains in charge of such 
emissions.  However, as previously noted, the volume of lead emissions from 
OCS sources is relatively small,285 and therefore it may make sense to first pri-
oritize updating other aspects of OCS air regulations.
3. Quantity of Pollutants Regulated
If an OCS polluting facility is subject to Clean Air Act Section 328, the 
facility qualifies as a “major emitting facility” or “major stationary source” that 
must comply with the emissions control requirements of the Clean Air Act’s 
PSD program if it has the “potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per 
year or more of any air pollutant.”286  The PSD program requires the facility 
to install the “best available control technology for each pollutant” over the 
threshold.287  The 250 tons per year threshold applies irrespective of how far 
from shore the facility is located.288
In contrast, BOEM regulations apply an exemption formula that consid-
ers both the amount of projected emissions and the distance of the proposed 
facility from shore.289  This “Emissions Exemption Threshold” (EET) exempts 
a facility from any further analysis or requirements if the projected emissions 
of a particular pollutant (in tons/year) will be less than the distance from shore 
(in miles) multiplied by 33.3.290  BOEM’s linear exemption equation, which 
284. Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://
www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-information-about-lead-air-pollution#health [https://
perma.cc/6LD8-NKKS].
285. For example, BOEM voluntarily chose to examine lead emissions in its 
Environmental Impact Statement for the recently approved (2018) “Liberty Development” 
in the Beaufort Sea, and the agency concluded “lead emissions from the project would not 
cause nor contribute to a violation of the lead National Atmospheric Air Quality Standards” 
because “[n]one of the fuels used for the project contain lead additives and only trace levels 
of lead would originate from equipment lubricants containing lead or engine wear.”  BOEM, 
Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS, supra note 119, at 4–33.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012).
288. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,730 n.26 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016).
289. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 20.
290. See 30 C.F.R. §  550.303(d) (2018); see also Air Quality Control, Reporting, and 
Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,730 (proposed Apr. 5, 2016) (explaining that “[i]f a pro-
posed plan would not cause emissions of criteria or precursor air pollutants in excess of the 
EET, the plan is not required to include a detailed air quality analysis.”).  BOEM rationalizes 
the its formula by citing its “distinct mandate to focus on State impacts from OCS facilities.” 
Id.
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was developed in 1979–1980, results in “most offshore sources receiving an 
exemption from air quality analysis and control requirements at the very first 
step.”291  Further, in comparison to EPA’s regulations, BOEM’s formula results 
in a higher (i.e. more lenient) trigger for emissions control obligations for any 
source located further than 7.5 miles from shore.292  The Pew Charitable Trust 
illustrated why BOEM’s exemption threshold is a more lenient standard than 
the EPA’s PSD requirements:
Under [BOEM]’s regulations, a large source of air pollution—for example, 
one that emits 300 tons per year of each of four pollutants: sulfur dioxide, 
or SO2; nitrogen dioxide, or NO2; particulate matter, or PM; and carbon 
monoxide, or CO; located in close proximity to the shoreline (for example, 
just under 10 miles from shore)—would be completely exempt from any 
analysis of its air quality impacts as well as any obligation to install pollu-
tion controls.  The same source, if regulated by EPA, would be categorized 
as a “‘major’” source, required to conduct a full air quality impact analy-
sis demonstrating compliance with all applicable air quality standards, and 
would be required—at a minimum—to apply the “best available control 
technology” for each pollutant and may also be required to install addi-
tional controls depending on the pollution source type.293
Or, as the Congressional Research Service put it, “if an OCS source would 
be located 30 miles from shore, it would be exempt from further air emission 
requirements as long as the projected emissions for each pollutant (SO2, PM, 
NOx, and VOC) were below its exemption threshold of 990 [tons per year],” 
while the same source under EPA standards would trigger Clean Air Act PSD 
requirements if it emitted more than 250 tons per year, “and states may have 
even lower thresholds that would apply to inner OCS sources [i.e. within 25 
miles of shore].”294
Needless to say, because the EPA’s OCS air regulations impose a more 
stringent quantitative trigger for emissions controls than do BOEM’s OCS air 
regulations, the EPA regulations are more protective of human health and are 
therefore preferable for protecting any community.  BOEM’s formula should 
be of particular concern to Native Alaskans, however.  Because BOEM’s for-
mula becomes even more lenient the further away from shore the facility is 
located, BOEM’s formula is disproportionately harmful to Native Alaskans 
who travel far offshore during their traditional fishing and whaling ventures.
4. Mobile Source Emissions
Neither BOEM nor the EPA requires mobile sources on the OCS to 
implement emissions controls.  EPA regulations interpret the Clean Air Act’s 
291. Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards, supra note 261, at 90.
292. EPA’s “major source” threshold (250 tons/year) divided by BOEM’s multiplier 
(33.3) = 7.5 miles.
293. Pew Charitable Trusts, Arctic Standards, supra note 261, at 90.
294. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 20.
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statutory definition of “OCS source” to allow emissions control requirements 
to apply to vessels only when they are permanently or physically attached 
to the seabed or physically attached to an OCS facility.295  BOEM takes the 
same position with respect to its own authority over mobile source emissions 
on the OCS.296
The two agencies diverge, however, on the issue of whether mobile source 
emissions count for the purpose of triggering emissions control requirements 
for the stationary source.  The EPA counts the emissions from mobile support 
vessels operating within twenty-five miles of a stationary OCS facility toward 
the calculation of whether the facility’s “potential to emit” exceeds the 250 
tons per year threshold and therefore is a “major source.”297  However, if the 
combined emissions from the stationary facility and its mobile support vessels 
qualify as a “major source,” the EPA applies PSD emissions controls to the sta-
tionary source, not the mobile vessels.
BOEM’s current guidance and practice is generally consistent with the 
EPA’s approach in counting mobile support vessels toward the emissions 
exemption threshold298—although, again, BOEM’s threshold is more lenient 
than EPA’s.  Notably, however, BOEM’s regulations do not require counting 
mobile support vessels toward the regulatory threshold,299 and BOEM’s prede-
cessors did not adopt this practice in Alaska.300
Accounting for mobile source emissions everywhere on the OCS is 
important, but it is especially important on the Arctic OCS, where eighty 
percent of emissions come from mobile sources.301  BOEM acknowledged 
this point in 2016, noting that because mobile support vessels in the Arctic 
295. See 40 C.F.R. 55.2 (2018).  Because Section 328 of the Clean Air Act makes the 
OCS subject to the Clean Air Act’s PSD Program in Title I, the EPA claims it does not have 
authority under Title I to regulate mobile sources on the OCS: “EPA is prohibited from 
directly regulating mobile sources under [the NSR and PSD provisions of the CAA].”  Outer 
Continental Shelf Air Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,792, 40,793–94 (Sept. 4, 1992) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. Part 55).  Rather, the EPA has explained that, if EPA were to regulate mobile 
source emissions on the OCS, it would need to do so under Title II of the Clean Air Act.  Id.
296. Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,735–736 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016).
297. Section 328 of the CAA, specifies that “emissions from any vessel servicing or 
associated with an OCS source, including emissions while at the OCS source or en route to 
or from the OCS source within 25 miles of the OCS source, shall be considered direct emis-
sions from the OCS source.”  42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(4)(C) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 
Outer Continental Shelf Air Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,792, 40,794 (Sept. 4, 1992) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 55) (explaining that “[a]ll vessel emissions related to OCS activity will be 
accounted for by including vessel emissions in the ‘potential to emit’ of an OCS source.”).
298. See Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,736 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016).
299. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 22.
300. See Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,736 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016).
301. Id.
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“generate far more emissions than the facilities they support, not account-
ing for their emissions makes it impossible to appropriately avoid authorizing 
activity causing or contributing to a violation of the NAAQS.”302  BOEM there-
fore proposed regulations that would codify its practice of “attributing [mobile 
support vessel] emissions to the approved facilities that the [mobile support 
vessels] support.”303  BOEM’s proposed regulations even went a step further 
than the EPA’s by proposing to count all mobile support vessels while they are 
“actually providing operational support, regardless of [their] distance from the 
facility.”304  BOEM explained that the EPA’s “blanket 25-mile radius” “does 
not capture most of the attributed emissions that occur between a port and 
the facility,” because increasing numbers of OCS facilities in recent years have 
been located further than 25 miles from shore.305  Further, excluding mobile 
source emissions that occur on the landward side of a 25-mile radius around a 
distant OCS facility would fail to account for emissions that have the greatest 
near-shore impacts.306  BOEM’s 2016 proposed rule also recognized that the 
EPA’s blanket 25-mile radius for counting mobile sources is particularly inad-
equate in the Arctic, where more polluting support vessels such as ice breakers 
are likely to operate more than twenty-five miles from the stationary facility, 
sometimes landward of the facility.307  However, as noted above, in 2017, Pres-
ident Trump and then-Department of the Interior Secretary Zinke ordered 
BOEM to cease all activity toward finalizing these proposed regulations.308
Although BOEM has abandoned its 2016 proposed rule, the proposal 
highlighted issues of import to Arctic OCS communities that should be incor-
porated into any OCS air quality regulations, regardless of whether BOEM or 
EPA is the responsible agency.  Specifically, the EPA should eliminate its 25-mile 
radius rule.  Mobile source emissions should be accounted for, and they should 
be counted regardless of how far they are operating from a stationary facility. 
Moreover, mobile support vessels on the OCS should be required to actually 
control their emissions.  Controlling such emissions is of particular import to 
Native Alaskans who spend significant amounts of time on the ocean, close 
to the emissions sources, during their traditional fishing and whaling expedi-
tions.  In addition, particular attention should be paid to controlling emissions 
from vessels like ice breakers that are unique to the Arctic and are more pol-
luting.  Neither the EPA’s nor BOEM’s current regulations adequately address 
these issues today.  Such mobile source regulation might require a statutory 
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 19,737.
305. Id. at 19,736.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. See supra Subpart III.E.1, at notes 271–72.
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amendment, but a creative combination of Clean Air Act Titles I, II, and III 
arguably provide the EPA with sufficient statutory authority.309
5. Timing of Project Approvals and Public Participation
The timeframe for project approvals and public participation is rushed 
both under OCSLA and under the EPA’s Clean Air Act OCS regulations, but 
in different ways.  The EPA’s regulations require it to provide only a 30-day 
comment period for OCS PSD permit reviews, though the EPA has discretion 
to extend or reopen comments if that would help expedite the decision pro-
cess.310  In addition, the EPA must grant a party’s request for a public hearing if 
the Administrator “finds on the basis of requests, a significant degree of public 
interest in a draft permit.”311
In contrast, BOEM examines the impact on ambient air quality as one 
of many factors considered during of its review and approval of an explora-
tion plan or development and production plan.312  OCSLA allows for a 60-day 
period for comments by the Governor of any affected state and “any inter-
ested person” during the approval process for “Development and Production 
Plans.”313  BOEM’s regulations reflect this 60-day deadline.314
While BOEM’s 60-day comment period may appear more generous than 
the EPA’s 30-day comment period, OCS air quality is the only issue considered 
during the EPA’s OCS permitting process, while air quality is but one factor 
considered under OCSLA in approving development and production plans. 
Further, the EPA’s 30-day period is a floor, with the option for extension, while 
OCSLA’s 60-day comment period is an express statutory deadline.  Therefore, 
while the EPA’s baseline requirement of a 30-day comment period is likely 
insufficient in many cases to allow for meaningful public participation, its flexi-
bility and singular focus on air quality make it likely a better avenue for public 
participation than OCSLA’s regulatory regime.  Allowing a robust opportunity 
for public participation is important for Native Alaskans and other environ-
mental justice communities because “meaningful participation of affected 
communities is one of the cornerstones of environmental justice,” and dia-
logue can help produce outcomes acceptable to the agency and stakeholders 
309. Title I of the Clean Air Act generally addresses stationary sources of air pollution; 
Title II addresses Mobile Sources; and Title III addresses multiple issues, including OCS air 
emissions.
310. 40 C.F.R. §§  71.11, 124.13; see also Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air 
Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, at 18.
311. 40 C.F.R. § 71.11(f)(1).
312. BOEM explains that it conducts its air quality analysis “whenever a lessee or oper-
ator proposes new exploration, development, or production operations on the OCS,” but 
that air quality is just “one factor that BOEM considers in making a determination on the 
overall plan.”  Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,717, 19,723 
(proposed Apr. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 500).
313. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(g) (2012).
314. 30 C.F.R. § 550.267(b) (2018).
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alike and avoid litigation or administrative review.315  Further, to the extent 
that stakeholders find litigation or administrative review necessary, establish-
ing a community’s concerns as a part of the official record is critical to success 
in court or before the EPA’s EAB, particularly for environmental justice con-
cerns, as was explained in Part II.
6. Opportunity for Administrative Appeal and Implications for 
Environmental Justice
Both the Clean Air Act and OCSLA provide for judicial review of an 
agency action alleged to be in violation of the statute, its implementing regula-
tions, or the terms of any permit or lease.316  Only the Clean Air Act, however, 
provides for administrative review via the EPA’s EAB, which “offers parties 
a powerful tool to compel agency review.”317  The Department of the Interior 
(BOEM’s parent agency) provides “no analogous process” to the EPA’s EAB.318
As explained in Part II.C, the availability of administrative review is 
important for parties seeking to address environmental justice concerns 
because President Clinton’s Environmental Justice Executive Order expressly 
does not “create any right to judicial review involving compliance or noncom-
pliance.”319  Further, the EPA’s EAB had developed positive precedent for 
including environmental justice in OCS air quality permitting.  Specifically, in 
2010 the EAB required the EPA to consider the impacts of air emissions from 
Shell’s Arctic OCS activities on Native Alaskans both onshore and during their 
offshore fishing and hunting activities.320
BOEM, on the other hand, recently demonstrated the inadequacy of its 
commitment to environmental justice and the inadequacy of OCSLA’s regu-
latory framework for considering impacts on Native Alaskans in an August 
2018 Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for an oil and gas Devel-
opment and Production Plan in the Beaufort Sea.  As explained in Part III.E.1, 
BOEM failed in that EIS to consider the impacts of offshore oil and gas 
315. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2013 EJ Report supra note 99, at 105 
(“Meaningful participation of affected communities is one of the cornerstones of environ-
mental justice and should be used to prevent conflicts before the need for [Alternate Dispute 
Resolution] or litigation arises.”); see also id. at iv (explaining that “the input of communities 
of color and low-income communities is integral to decision-making, planning, monitoring, 
problem-solving, and implementation and evaluation of environmental policies and prac-
tices.  Low-income and minority communities, however, still do not fully participate in the 
process because of language and cultural barriers and lack of access to information.  Federal 
agencies must make early and meaningful public participation in siting and permitting deci-
sions a reality for overburdened communities of color and poor communities.”).
316. See 43 U.S.C. §  1349 (2012) (OCSLA “Citizens suits, jurisdiction and judicial 
review”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (Clean Air Act citizen suit provision).
317. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 25.
318. Id. at 28.
319. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 6–609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
320. See supra Part II.D.
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activities on Native fishers and hunters while they are at sea and near the emis-
sions sources.321  BOEM also failed to consider how the prevailing winds in 
the summer—the season when drilling occurs—would blow offshore air pol-
lutants southwest, right into the Village of Nuiqsut.322  The legal barriers for 
the Native Village of Nuiqsut to redress these problems are threefold.  First, 
OCSLA provides them no avenue to require BOEM to consider offshore air 
quality.323  Second, Executive Order 12898 provides them no judicial review 
of environmental justice impacts324 and BOEM provides no administrative 
review equivalent to the EPA’s process.325  Third, NEPA might allow for judicial 
review of offshore and environmental justice concerns if such concerns were 
raised in public comments, but agencies win in the overwhelming majority of 
NEPA challenges,326 and a court might find such concerns to be in conflict with 
OCSLA’s focus on onshore, rather than offshore, air quality.
7. Comparing the EJ Commitments of BOEM versus EPA
Even if BOEM and the Department of the Interior had an administrative 
appeals process equivalent to that of the EPA’s EAB, the EPA’s commitment 
to environmental justice is more robust than that of BOEM or the Interior 
Department.  The EPA has a comprehensive set of plans, guidance documents, 
strategic collaboration initiatives, and grant-giving programs to support envi-
ronmental justice both as a part of and outside of regulatory action.327  In 
comparison, the Department of the Interior and BOEM have a relatively 
simple approach to environmental justice.328  Since 1995,329 the Department of 
the Interior has had an environmental justice strategic plan that outlines 
broad goals for including environmental justice communities in the agency’s 
321. BOEM, Liberty Development and Production Plan, FEIS, supra note 119, at 
4-39, 4-42.
322. Id.
323. See supra Subpart III.E.1.
324. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 6–609 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
325. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 34, 
at 28.
326. See supra Subpart II.C.3.
327. See generally Environmental Justice, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.
gov/environmentaljustice [https://perma.cc/JDT9-QZXV]; see also supra note 173 (list-
ing EPA environmental justice plans and policy documents); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA’s NEPA 
Compliance Analyses (Apr. 1998); U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, Final Guidance for 
Consideration of Environmental Justice in Clear Air Act 309 Reviews (Jul. 1999).
328. See generally Environmental Justice, Dep’t of the Interior https://www.doi.gov/
oepc/resources/environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/ZS3A-8GBW] (providing one para-
graph of text, followed by links to the Department’s Environmental Justice Memorandum 
with the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Department’s Environmental 
Justice Strategic Plan, and the Department’s Environmental Justice Annual Implementation 
Report(s)).
329. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Strategic Plan Environmental Justice (1995).
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decisionmaking, and the Department published updates to these plans in 
2012330 and November 2016.331  However, the Department of the Interior’s 
plans do not go to the same level of detail, depth, or breadth as the EPA’s. 
Moreover, although the Department of the Interior’s plan includes BOEM 
by reference,332 BOEM lacks its own tailored environmental justice plan, 
which can and has led to disjointed implementation by BOEM.  The discon-
nect between the Department of the Interior’s environmental justice plan 
and BOEM’s OCS actions was evidenced in a 2016 BOEM report on its OCS 
regulatory framework, which relied on BOEM’s existing public participation 
processes under NEPA to fulfill the mandate of Executive Order 12898.333 
Reliance solely on existing NEPA processes to achieve environmental justice 
is inadequate because NEPA’s environmental review is not a truly substantive 
or proactive action and BOEM’s OCS permitting processes provide minimal 
opportunity for public participation.334  Further, BOEM’s reliance on the fact 
that the NEPA process is an “open process that provides opportunities for all 
participants”335 ignores barriers that environmental justice communities face in 
meaningfully participating in government decisionmaking.336  As the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights has recognized, “Meaningful participation of affected 
communities is one of the cornerstones of environmental justice,” and Exec-
utive Order 12,898 was meant to broaden public participation beyond that 
already mandated by NEPA and “provide[] environmental justice communi-
ties with another mechanism to use concurrently with the NEPA requirement 
of public participation.”337
330. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Environmental Justice Strategic Plan 2012–
2017 (Mar. 27, 2012).
331. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Environmental Justice Strategic Plan (Nov. 
2016).
332. See id. at 2.
333. Cameron & Matthews, BOEM, supra note 259, at 38, Section 3.37 (“BOEM’s 
existing NEPA process invites participation by all groups and communities in the develop-
ment of its proposed actions, alternatives, and potential mitigating measures.  Scoping and 
review for NEPA document are an open process that provides opportunities for all partici-
pants, including minority and low-income populations, to raise new expressions of concern 
that can be addressed in the documents.  Impacts to socioeconomic conditions, commercial 
fisheries, air quality, and water quality are considered in the analysis of effects of the pro-
posed actions on local populations or resources used by local groups, including minority and 
low-income groups.”).
334. Cong. Research Serv., Controlling Air Emissions from the OCS, supra note 
34, at 24 (describing the limited opportunities for public participation in OCS oil and gas 
approvals); see also supra Subpart III.E.5.
335. Cameron & Matthews, BOEM, supra note 259, at 38, Section 3.37.
336. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 2013 EJ Report supra note 99, at iv (“Low-income 
and minority communities, however, do not fully participate in the process [of developing 
and implementing environmental policies and practices] because of language and cultural 
barriers and lack of access to information.”).
337. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 2013 EJ Report supra note 99, at 105–106.
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Notwithstanding the above evidence that the EPA appears to be the supe-
rior agency for addressing the environmental justice impacts of Arctic OCS 
development on Native Alaskans, the EPA still has room for improvement. 
For example, only about one-third of the EPA’s administrative compliance 
orders, administrative penalty orders, and judicial consent decrees were issued 
in areas of potential environmental justice concern.338  In addition, although 
the EPA reported in 2018 that low-income people are increasingly living in 
areas in attainment with NAAQS for fine particulate matter, the EPA also 
reported that the areas remaining in nonattainment are disproportionately 
low-income.339  The EPA should focus air quality enforcement efforts, policies, 
and programs in environmental justice communities.
Moreover, regardless of whether the EPA or BOEM oversees Arctic OCS 
air regulations, both agencies’ environmental justice programs and policies are 
threatened by the defunding and deregulation efforts of the Trump Admin-
istration.  For example, in 2018, President Trump proposed to cut the EPA’s 
Environmental Justice Grants budget to less than one-third of its previous 
level, from “$6.74 million enacted for FY2018 to $2.0 million for FY2019.”340  In 
addition, both the Department of the Interior and the EPA have taken steps to 
“walk back already anemic federal environmental-justice work.”341  The EPA, 
for example, has been “putting a stop to some civil-rights investigations and 
replacing or firing many of the scientists with deep technical knowledge of the 
subject.”342  In addition, “changes to move the offices of environmental justice 
into a policy office  .  .  . promise to further reduce the autonomy of life-long 
environmental-justice staffers and reduce the effectiveness of their work.”343 
Likewise, the Department of the Interior in September 2018 “quietly rescinded 
two memos that provided guidance on protecting vulnerable communities and 
Native Americans.”344  Hence, both agencies’ environmental justice programs 
will need to be rebuilt by future administrations and by Congressional efforts
Conclusion
This Comment highlighted the unique and pressing threat imposed on 
Native Alaskans by air pollution from oil and gas development on the Arctic 
338. Specifically, only 33 percent of Administrative Compliance Orders, 36 percent of 
Final Administrative Penalty Orders, 32 percent of Judicial Consent Decrees, and 35 percent 
of pollutants reduced were issued in Areas with Potential EJ Concern.  EPA Environmental 
Justice FY2017 Progress Report, 240-R1–8001, at 33–34 (Apr. 2018).
339. Id. at 10.
340. Cong. Research Serv., Role of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 
Environmental Justice, IF 10529, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2018).
341. See Newkirk II, supra note 105.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Adam Federman, The Interior Department is Sidelining Environmental Justice, 
The Nation (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/interior-department- 
environmental-justice-arctic-drilling-energy-dominance [https://perma.cc/7HK6-WY3P].
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OCS.  More importantly, this Comment shed light on the inadequacies of the 
legal tools currently available for Native Alaskans to redress this environ-
mental justice issue and protect their air, health, and way of life.  The need to 
correct these inadequacies is urgent, both because of President Trump’s pro-
posals to drill in the Arctic and because climate change is melting Arctic sea ice 
and opening up previously inaccessible areas of the Arctic OCS.
This Comment has demonstrated that a three-pronged statutory and reg-
ulatory reform would help address the environmental justice impacts of air 
emissions from OCS development: (1) Congress should return all OCS air reg-
ulation to the Clean Air Act and the EPA; (2) the EPA should update its OCS 
air regulations; and (3) Congress should adopt a comprehensive and enforce-
able environmental justice statute.
First, Congress should return all OCS air regulation to the Clean Air Act 
and the EPA.  The Clean Air Act is a better statute than OCSLA to address air 
pollution on the OCS in general, but the Clean Air Act and the EPA are par-
ticularly better for addressing environmental justice issues exacerbated by air 
pollution from OCS oil and gas development.  The EPA’s commitment to envi-
ronmental justice and the internal administrative remedies available through 
the EAB—in contrast to the remedies available through BOEM and the 
Department of Interior—at least allows aggrieved parties to raise environmen-
tal justice claims and sometimes receive relief.  Moreover, housing air quality 
permitting with BOEM creates a potential conflict of interest that President 
Obama and the Department of the Interior sought to eliminate with a reorga-
nization after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, when they assigned BSEE to 
address health and safety regulation, while BOEM was to focus on promotion 
of OCS development.345
Second, notwithstanding the fact that the EPA and its regulations are 
better than BOEM for addressing air quality and environmental justice issues 
on the OCS, the EPA’s regulations and its enforcement thereof still need 
improvement.  As evidenced by Shell’s disastrous development near Alas-
ka’s North Slope in 2012 and the company’s noncompliance with its OCS air 
quality permit,346 the EPA has room to improve its enforcement efforts on the 
Alaska OCS.  Further, the EPA should target its environmental enforcement 
efforts in areas with potential environmental justice concerns, as discussed in 
Subpart IV.E.7.347  In addition, as discussed in Subpart IV.E.4, the EPA should 
update how its OCS air regulations address mobile sources.  Specifically, the 
EPA should eliminate its 25-mile radius rule and instead regulate mobile sup-
port vessels anywhere on the OCS, and it should require mobile sources on the 
OCS to actually control emissions.
345. See supra Part I.B.  DOI split MMS into three agencies in 2011, after recognizing 
that it is unwise to put the same agency in charge of both leasing (now lodged with BOEM) 
and environmental and safety checks (now generally lodged with BSEE).
346. See supra Part II.D.
347. EPA, supra note 338.
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Third and finally, in order to permanently achieve environmental justice 
for all overburdened communities, Congress should do what countless advo-
cates have previously called for—adopt an enforceable environmental justice 
statute with appropriate funding attached, rather than relying on an unen-
forceable executive order that is subject to the whims of each president.348 
Environmental justice issues will only become more acute for Native Alaskans 
and environmental justice communities everywhere as a result of the Trump 
Administration’s energy policies and environmental justice rollbacks.  As dis-
cussed in Subpart IV.E.7, the Trump Administration has been quietly defunding 
and rescinding the environmental justice programs and policies of both the 
EPA and the Department of Interior.  These environmental justice rollbacks 
are occurring just as the Trump Administration is pursuing energy policies that 
will put more Native Alaskans at risk from the air pollution that OCS develop-
ment—and especially OCS development in the Arctic Ocean—creates.  Native 
Alaskans, and all environmental justice communities in the United States, 
deserve effective legal avenues for protecting their individual and community 
health and welfare.  Codifying environmental justice policies and funding in 
an enforceable statute, on top of making the above recommended changes to 
OCS air regulations, would be a major step forward for Native Alaskans and 
other environmental justice communities.
348. See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 2013 EJ Report supra note 99, at 169 
(“Congress should pass a Civil Rights Restoration Act to clearly and unambiguously provide 
for a private right of action for disparate impact claims under § 602 of Title VI and § 1983.”).

